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Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial
Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex
Post Facto Clause
Harold J. Krent*
In Lynce v. Mathis,' the Supreme Court this past term reaf-
firmed that the Ex Post Facto Clause2 bars retroactive application
of legislation that either criminalizes conduct that was legal when
undertaken or extends the punishment for those who have previ-
ously committed criminal acts. To alleviate prison overcrowding,
Florida in the early 1980s 3 granted prisoners administrative gain
time allowances 4 to expedite their release from prison. In light of
adverse publicity, the legislature revisited the question in 1992
and decided to deny gain time to inmates committing certain seri-
ous crimes.5 In striking down retroactive application of that
amendment, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohib-
its applying the new provision to those who committed offenses
prior to adoption of the amendment. The Court acknowledged that
Florida's legislature enjoyed the prerogative to adjust its gain time
provisions as it deemed appropriate, and it noted no constitutional
problem with exempting certain classes of defendants from the
purview of gain time provisions. 6 But the Court held that the leg-
* Professor, Freehling Scholar, and Associate Dean, Chicago-Kent College of
Law. I would like to thank Rick Hasen for his comments on an earlier draft and
Amy Smith for her diligent research assistance.
1. 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997).
2. U.S. Conast. art. I, §§ 9, 10. The Constitution prohibits both the federal
government and the states from passing "any ex post facto law." Id.
3. See Correctional Reform Act of 1983, 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-131.
4. Some prison systems grant good time credit allowances to provide incen-
tive for responsible behavior in prison. Because of overcrowding (among other rea-
sons), some prison systems award credits merely based on the number of days
served in prison.
5. See 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 89-100; see also 92-96 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 283
(1992).
6. See Lynce, 117 S. Ct. at 897-98.
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islative purpose of the amendment was immaterial in considering
the ex post facto challenge; rather, the key determinant was that
the new statute "had the effect of lengthening petitioner's period of
incarceration."7
The Supreme Court's decision in Lynce is consistent with a
surprising body of case law rigorously protecting criminal defend-
ants from retroactive8 alteration of the terms and conditions of
their sentences. The Court has struck down legislative efforts to
apply revised sentencing guidelines retroactively even when the
punishment meted out under both versions may have been the
same;9 invalidated retroactive amendment of an incentive good-
time credit law that would have required any parole violator to for-
feit previously accrued good time credits, even when the violator
was on notice of the enhanced penalties;' 0 and implied that any
retroactive change in parole eligibility"' would similarly violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 12
Despite the Supreme Court's strictures on retroactive law-
making in the criminal context, the Court has declined to impose
ex post facto restrictions on judicial decision-making. The lan-
guage of the Clause apparently refers only to the legislature, for it
forbids states and the federal government from "pass [ing]" any "ex
7. Id. at 896.
8. By retroactivity, I refer to the commonly used definition of altering the
legal status of acts completed before the new law was passed. See Landgrafv. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994) (specifying that a "court must ask
whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment"); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 31 (1981) (noting that the
"critical question is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts com-
pleted before its effective date"). This definition must be distinguished from retro-
active effects, for most prospective legislation has a retroactive impact on previous
conduct, such as investments.
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
10. See Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), affd per
curiam, 390 U.S. 713 (1968).
11. In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995),
the Court held that the mere increase in intervals between parole hearings did not
constitute an increase in punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The Court reasoned that, because the prisoners in question "ha[d] no rea-
sonable chance of being released," id. at 507, and because they could have re-
quested expedited consideration in extraordinary situations, the delay was
permissible in that "there is no reason to think that such postponement would
extend any prisoner's actual period of confinement," id. at 513.
12. See Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (stating that parole eligibility
is annexed to the original sentence).
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post facto law."13 Indeed, as early as the 1798 United States
Supreme Court decision in Calder v. Bull,'14 several Justices
opined that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to judicial deci-
sions,' 5 and the Court has never struck down any judicial act on
that basis.
From the perspective of the criminally accused, however, it is
not obvious why judicial action should be exempt from ex post facto
scrutiny. Although federal courts have abjured common lawmak-
ing in the criminal context,' 6 they-like all courts-interpret and
reinterpret legislative provisions bearing on criminal responsibil-
ity. Those reinterpretations can have the same effect as legislative
amendments in redefining a statute to include additional prohib-
ited conduct or in lengthening the severity of a sentence. 17 Judges
presiding over a case may bend or transmute a legislative provi-
sion to ensure that the accused-especially when the anti-social
act is particularly odious-receives punishment. To the extent
that the Ex Post Facto Clause protects reliance interests, the iden-
tity of the governmental actor causing the injury seems irrelevant.
In light of these realities, the Supreme Court in Bouie v. City
of Columbia'8 held that ex post facto principles as read into the
Due Process Clause applied to judicial decision-making. The Court
recognized that retroactive change in judicial doctrine could be as
problematic as retroactive legislation. Neither courts nor legisla-
tures can criminalize an act that was legal when undertaken nor
extend the punishment of an offender after a crime has been com-
mitted. Why should the judicial power to punish be less circum-
scribed than that of the legislature when the effect on the
individual is identical? The Court reasoned:
[An unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute,
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto
law .... If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto
13. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
14. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
16. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
Nonetheless, for a discussion of the common lawmaking that in fact exists today,
despite Hudson & Goodwin, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law
Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345.
17. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
Harv. L. Rev. 469 (1996) (addressing the impact of judicial interpretation of
broadly phrased criminal provisions on individuals).
18. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
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Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State
Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from
achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.19
Any unforeseeable judicial interpretation of a statute or change in
common law doctrine may give rise to the same concerns underly-
ing the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Indeed, in Lynce, the change in administrative gain time likely
stemmed from judicial interpretation of the statute rescinding
credits as opposed to legislative instigation. Florida's 1992 statute
was silent as to its retroactive effect, and the Department of Cor-
rections initially applied the provisions prospectively only, freeing
those who would otherwise be due for release under the prior gain
time provisions. 20 However, the Attorney General issued an opin-
ion later that year directing that the amendment be applied retro-
actively,21 and Florida's courts ultimately agreed, creating the
retroactivity problem.22 From the defendant's perspective, it
should not make much difference whether the increased punish-
ment stemmed from the legislature or from judicial reinterpreta-
tion of the legislation.
But the promise of Bouie has been largely illusory. Courts
have resorted to a number of devices to curtail drastically the im-
pact of applying ex post facto principles to judicial action. First,
they have limited the due process inquiry to unforeseeable judicial
19. Id. at 353-54. The Court adopted similar reasoning several years later in
Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972). See also Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977) (holding that the Due Process Clause prevented retroactive appli-
cation of a new judicial test for ascertaining pornography restrictions); Douglas v.
Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (holding that the judge's construction of the term
"arrest" to include traffic citation was unforeseeable); cf Helton v. Fauver, 930
F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that New Jersey's construction of a ju-
risdictional statute affecting prosecution of juveniles was unforeseeable); Moore v.
Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that the state court's change in
felony murder doctrine was not foreseeable).
20. See Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891, 894 n.10. (1997).
21. See 92-96 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 283 (1992). The Attorney General's opinion
was surprising in that previous amendments to the administrative gain time pro-
visions had been held to be prospective only. See id. at 287-88.
22. See Brief of Respondent Mathis at 3, Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891
(1997) (No. 95-7452); see also Brief for the Florida Public Defenders Ass'n, Inc., as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 4, Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891
(1997) (No. 95-7452).
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changes in the law.23 In contrast, courts do not permit legislative
change to be applied retroactively even when that change-as per-
haps in Lynce24-can be considered foreseeable.
Second, courts have construed the foreseeability requirement
generously. They have termed judicial interpretations foreseeable
that departed considerably from the legislative text 25 and that re-
versed a settled line of precedent.26 The foreseeability analysis
seems little more than a rational basis type inquiry-courts will
now reverse on Bouie grounds only when the judicial change seems
entirely arbitrary. Courts routinely sanction judicial change that
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if initiated by the
legislature.
23. See, e.g., Bouie, 378 U.S. at 347. The Court in Bouie stressed foreseeabil-
ity, and lower courts have accordingly invalidated only judicial changes that they
deemed unforeseeable. See infra text accompanying notes 107-56.
24. Florida's legislature had revisited the question of gain time policies sev-
eral times both prior to and after the petitioner's crime. The gain time provisions
were rewritten in part in 1983, see 1983 Fla. Laws ch. 83-131, § 8; in 1987, see 1987
Fla. Laws ch. 87-232, § 1; in 1989, see 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-100; in 1991, see 1991
Fla. Laws ch.91-281, § 3; in 1992, see 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 89-100 (the relevant year
to Lynce); again in 1993, see 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-406, § 26; and again in 1995, see
1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-184, § 26. One could have speculated that early release of
serious offenders-such as the felon convicted of attempted murder in Lynce-
would prompt reassessment of the wisdom of such policies. Early release policies
have often generated considerable political furor when an offender upon release
has committed a particularly grisly offense. The famed Willie Horton incident that
captured the attention of the public during the Dukakis-Bush campaign in 1988 is
a prime example. See, e.g., Jacob V. Lamar, The One That Got Away, Time, June
27, 1988, at 22, available in 1988 WL 2599035. The wave of sexual offender regis-
tration laws passed in the wake of the tragic murder of Megan Kanka and others
presents another example. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 2c:7-1 to 7-11 (1995); Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 707-743 (1995); Iowa Code Ann. 692A.2 (1995); Wash. Rev. Code
9A.44.130; Ga. Code Ann. 42-1-12 (1996); see also Gary Marx, Edgar Signs a
Stricter Truth-in-Sentencing Law, Chi. Trib. Aug. 21, 1995, Chicagoland, at 1,
available in 1995 WL 6238246 (stating that a new law was signed in part in reac-
tion to a brutal killing of child by an individual who had been released from prison
after serving time for another murder).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Shannon, 110 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that violation of a statute prohibiting statutory rape, even when the relationship is
consensual, must be construed as a "violent" offense for purposes of sentencing
enhancement); State v. Mummey, 871 P.2d 868 (Mont. 1994) (holding that a tennis
shoe satisfies the statutory definition of a weapon).
26. See, e.g., Hagan v. Caspari, 50 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
state supreme court reversal of an established line of appellate court authority was
foreseeable); Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that reversal
of a state supreme court's decision limiting evidence to be used for sentencing en-
hancement was foreseeable).
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In Part I, I first sketch the Supreme Court's current elabora-
tion of the ex post facto doctrine. The Court has declined to apply
the Clause itself to judicial acts, but has rigorously reviewed legis-
lative enactments to ensure that the legislature neither has
criminalized an act that was permissible when completed, nor in-
creased the punishment for an offense after the fact. I next con-
sider the underlying principles of the Court's ex post facto doctrine,
which are to prevent arbitrary governance and honor individuals'
reliance interests.
In Part II, I explore the Bouie line of cases. Although the
Supreme Court has held that ex post facto principles now apply to
courts through the Due Process Clause, that precept does not re-
flect current judicial practice. Courts have paid lip service to
Bouie, but by and large have refused to afford individuals signifi-
cant protection from retroactive judicial change. Courts have not
protected individuals' interests in reliance, nor prevented lower
courts from adopting unlikely or stretched interpretations of com-
mon law precedents or statutory text. A rough empirical study
confirms the sparse utilization of Bouie by courts, particularly in
the federal system. Courts apparently remain unconvinced that ex
post facto principles should limit judicial discretion in the criminal
context.
In Part III, I canvas several explanations that attempt to jus-
tify the divergence between legislative and judicial retroactivity
doctrine concerning criminal law issues, despite comparable im-
pacts on the individual. The first explanation rests on a Black-
stonian distinction between lawmaking and adjudication, namely
that legislatures fashion new principles while courts merely "find"
the law. If judges state what the law is, then applying their inter-
pretations retroactively should not upset reliance interests, for
members of society cannot reasonably rely on what was not "law."
In contrast, legislators make new law, so that retroactive applica-
tion, in at least some contexts, tramples upon settled expectations.
Second, a political explanation suggests instead that judges al-
ways should apply new rules retroactively as a means of re-
straining judicial power. Most judges will be loath to change the
law if in so doing they must affect the rights not only of litigants
before them but also those of countless others who relied on the
former law. Indeed, federal courts now must apply all new consti-
tutional rules retroactively in both the civil and criminal procedure
JUDICIAL RETROACTIVE LAWMAKING
contexts. Mandated retroactivity reflects a conservative bias in
favor of the status quo.
The third explanation focuses alternatively on the institu-
tional differences between legislatures and courts. Judges operate
interstitially by formulating rules to govern particular disputes.
Judicial retroactivity does not impinge on as many interests at one
time as can legislative retroactivity. Moreover, judicial retroactiv-
ity is bounded by the arguments raised by the parties in particular
cases and controversies. Judicial retroactivity is therefore more in-
evitable and yet less threatening than retroactive application of
legislatively designed rules of conduct.
Finally, I pursue an interest group explanation, which posits
that legislators have more to gain than judges in singling out disfa-
vored parties for disadvantageous treatment. Legislators too read-
ily penalize unpopular groups in passing legislation to curry favor
with both potential contributors and voters. Those subject to crim-
inal penalties, because of their marginal position in society, rarely
can influence legislators to the extent commensurate with their
numbers. In comparison, judges may be better insulated from in-
terest group pressures, and may have less reason to vent spleen
against the criminally accused. State judges, however, because
they are more accountable to majoritarian political pressures, ar-
guably pose more of a risk of arbitrary and vindictive behavior
than do their federal counterparts.
I conclude that, although none of these explanations is over-
whelming, the interest group justification goes farthest in plausi-
bly explaining why legislative retroactivity in the criminal context
is more disfavored than lawmaking by judges. In light of the in-
centives facing legislators, we tolerate less legislative than judicial
retroactive lawmaking, even though judges on occasion may ma-
nipulate doctrine to punish particular individuals more harshly.
Political realities therefore have leavened the more abstract norm
against retroactivity espoused in Bouie.
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I. Ex POST FACTO PRINCIPLES
A. Ex Post Facto Clause
Neither Congress nor the states may pass "any ex post facto
Law."27 Within a decade after ratification of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull28 addressed the Ex Post Facto
Clause in depth. The Court stated that the Clause should be
viewed as an "additional bulwark in favour of the personal security
of the subject, to protect his person from punishment by legislative
acts, having a retrospective operation."29 Justice Chase delineated
the contexts in which the prohibition applied:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater pun-
ishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when commit-
ted. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law re-
quired at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to
convict the offender.30
Legislatures rarely have impinged upon the first two catego-
ries set in Calder, which prohibit criminalizing an action that was
innocent when done or increasing the severity of a crime's classifi-
cation (to a felony as opposed to a misdemeanor) after the fact. Nu-
merous controversies, however, have arisen over the last two
categories. In particular, the Court vigorously has enforced the
prohibition on changes in the law that have a substantial potential
to increase an offender's stay in prison.31
27. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10. In contrast, the Contract Clause only applies
to laws passed at the state level. Id. § 10.
28. 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
29. Id. at 390 (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted).
30. Id. (emphasis omitted).
31. The Court in recent years has restricted the prohibition's impact on
changes in the rules of evidence and procedure. Compare Thompson v. Utah, 170
U.S. 343 (1898) (barring retrospective application of a state law requiring only 8
instead of 12 jurors), and Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) (prohibiting retro-
active repeal of a state rule treating conviction for a lesser included offense as an
acquittal of greater offense), with Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (up-
holding a statute authorizing state appellate court to reform unauthorized verdicts
without remanding for a new trial), and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977)
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The Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Florida32 is exem-
plary. There, the court invalidated retroactive application of Flor-
ida's change in sentencing regulations that had the effect of
presumptively increasing the offender's sentence. The offender
may have received the same sentence under both schemes, but the
likelihood of a stiffer sentence increased with the new law. Simi-
larly, the Court in Lindsey v. Washington3 3 held that a state could
not, without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, retrospectively al-
ter a discretionary sentencing range with a maximum of a fifteen-
year penalty to a mandatory fifteen-year sentence. 34
The Court has prohibited not only retroactive increases of an
offender's sentence, but also any change that imposes greater legal
obstacles to early release. In Weaver v. Graham,35 the Court ex-
plained that a state's retroactive change in its good time credit pol-
icy violated the Ex Post Facto Clause if the change "constrict[ed]
the inmate's opportunity to earn early release."3 6 Because inmates
under the new good time credit policy could not as easily accumu-
late good time credits, the Court invalidated its retroactive appli-
cation. The Court in Lynce extended Weaver to apply to Florida's
effort to rescind administrative gain time credits awarded for the
administrative purpose of alleviating overcrowding. Thus, through
the Ex Post Facto Clause the Court has prevented legislatures
from applying changes in criminal penalties retroactively.
Two principles underlie the Court's ex post facto jurispru-
dence. The first centers on notice. The Court has stressed that the
legislature must give fair notice of proscribed conduct. 37 Individu-
(upholding retroactive alteration of a death penalty procedure changing roles of
the judge and jury in sentencing).
32. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
33. 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
34. In addition, every appellate court which has considered the issue has simi-
larly invalidated retroactive application of the new federal sentencing guidelines.
See, e.g., United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779 (4th
Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Lambros, 65 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 1995) (invali-
dating application of new sentencing provisions). The guidelines, despite their
name, are mandatory. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
35. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
36. Id. at 35-36.
37. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430 (1987); Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28;
Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 485 (4th Cir. 1993). The Ex Post Facto Clause is
akin in this respect to the void for vagueness doctrine. See Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding that vague provisions "fail[ I to give
1997]
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als are entitled to rely on the law in structuring their actions.
Before it can criminalize a particular assault 38 or business trans-
action,39 the legislature must provide fair notice of its intent. Indi-
viduals should then be free to choose whether to transgress
society's criminal prohibitions.
Similarly, individuals must have notice of the range of penal-
ties prior to consummation of the criminal offense. As one court of
appeals explained, "[pirinciples of fairness thus require that this
actor, in making his decision whether to act, be fully informed as to
... what type of punishment one guilty of the criminal act can
expect."40 Or, as the Supreme Court has explained, an "indigent
defendant engaged in negotiations that may lead to an acknowl-
edgment of guilt and a suitable punishment"41 is entitled to rely on
the existing legal framework. To the courts, fairness concerns dic-
tate that individuals be afforded notice of the conduct proscribed
and the potential penalty before they can be punished for their
anti-social conduct.
The second and related principle is that the Ex Post Facto
Clause furthers rule of law values by limiting legislative power. If
the legislature could alter rules of criminal conduct and punish-
ment retroactively, then its power could expand exponentially. In
exercising that power, the legislature could single out individuals
for criminal sanctions in response to news of horrifying anti-social
acts. In light of these problems, the Supreme Court in Weaver v.
Graham42 explained that the Ex Post Facto Clause "restricts gov-
ernmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindic-
tive legislation." 43 A requirement of prospectivity minimizes the
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is for-
bidden by statute") (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954));
State v. Palendrano, 293 A.2d 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
38. Cf. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (holding that the
killing of a fetus cannot be considered murder in the absence of notice that "fetus"
fell within the legislative classification of human being).
39. Cf. Fogie v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 95 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a rent-to-own business had sufficient notice that transactions were subject to pen-
alties under the usury laws), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1427 (1997); People v. Sobiek,
106 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1973) (holding that the defendant was on sufficient
notice that theft from other partners in a business partnership could be
prosecuted).
40. Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930, 935 (6th Cir. 1989).
41. Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891, 895 (1997).
42. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
43. Id. at 29.
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risk that legislators will use the criminal law to target individuals
or groups based on prior conduct. As the Supreme Court recently
stated in Lynce, "[tihe specific prohibition on ex post facto laws is
... one aspect of the broader constitutional protection against arbi-
trary changes in the law."44 Enforcement of ex post facto princi-
ples restrains legislative excesses and preserves a wider swath of
individual liberty.
This is not to suggest that the Supreme Court's reasoning is
beyond reproach. Indeed, the Court's rationale in part is deeply
disturbing. Little apparent reason exists why notice should be the
focal point of the ex post facto doctrine. Not only is it questionable
whether we should always safeguard an offender's reliance inter-
est, but courts have invoked the Ex Post Facto Clause even when
no reliance interest is conceivably present.45
An offender's reliance interest is most significant when the
legislature criminalizes conduct that was permissible when under-
taken. Arguably, before the sale of technology overseas can be
punished by criminal sanctions, those engaged in such technology
transfers should at least be aware of the potential for criminal pen-
alties. Yet the notice requirement is fictional in many respects.
Most members of society do not learn the criminal code and could
not in any event understand statutory or regulatory requirements
without considerable legal help.46 For example, we routinely pun-
ish individuals who had no actual notice that they were violating
44. Lynce, 117 S. Ct. at 895.
45. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Harold J. Krent, The
Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 Geo.
L.J. 2143, 2160-65 (1996). For a related critique of the liberal conception of nonret-
roactivity, see Dan M. Kahan, Some Realism About Retroactive Lawmaking, 3
Roger Wins. U. L. Rev. 95 (1997).
46. See Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 83-87 (1968);
John C. Jeifries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes,
71 Va. L. Rev. 189 (1985). Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S.
25 (1931), stated:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will un-
derstand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To
make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.
Id. at 27.
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convoluted IRS regulations or counterintuitive applications of the
racketeering laws.47
Moreover, society may not wish to protect reliance in many
criminal law settings. When the conduct poses a danger to others,
why forego punishment even if the precise conduct previously had
not been criminalized? The knowing sale of dangerous halluci-
nogens should not be protected even if selling a combination of pre-
scription drugs was not prohibited.48 In traditional criminal law
jargon, ignorance of the law is no excuse if the conduct is mala in
se, or wrongful in itself.49
Notice may be more important in mala prohibitum settings,
when Congress retroactively creates a regulatory crime. If the pro-
hibition does not reach blameworthy conduct, individuals should
47. Criminal law doctrine in general does not demand actual notice. The
Supreme Court has never asked whether an offender actually relied on a particu-
lar statutory scheme prior to committing the offense. No empirical evidence likely
exists demonstrating that offenders rely on the details of a state's good time credit
or parole policy before committing an offense.
And, in Greenfield v. Scafati, 277 F. Supp. 644 (D. Mass. 1967), affd per
curiam, 390 U.S. 713 (1968), inmates were on constructive notice of the enhanced
penalties for parole violation, at least before engaging in conduct violating parole.
Many lower courts have followed the logic in Greenfield by holding that the issue of
the offender's notice is totally irrelevant. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d
1117 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1992) ("The fact that Parriett was 'on
notice' of the consequences of [violation of the conditions on supervised release]
during the term of his supervised release does not serve to insulate the statutory
revisions from review under the ex post facto clause."); Fender v. Thompson, 883
F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1989); Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. See also Kahan, supra note 16, at 415-16 (agreeing that protecting reli-
ance interest in the criminal context is not always normatively desirable).
49. In the mala in se context, perhaps constructive notice is more relevant
than reliance itself. The concern is not for the individual interest but for the sys-
temic protections flowing from such notice. Commentators believe that the ration-
ale underlying the principle of legality or fair notice turns on limiting the power of
the police and prosecutors, see Jeffries, supra note 46, not protecting individual
reliance. When the standards of criminal conduct are set before hand-and thus
individuals are subject to constructive notice-administrative officials can less
likely apply criminal prohibitions in an arbitrary or vindictive manner. The prob-
lem with a vague loitering statute is not so much the lack of notice to individuals
as the license afforded to police officials to enforce the statute arbitrarily.
Yet, if Congress establishes the standard of criminal conduct, there is no
longer the same concern for overreaching by police and prosecutors. Congressional
action circumscribes the discretion of enforcement officials, as long as the standard
of conduct-even if applied retroactively-is clear. The constructive notice argu-
ment, therefore, does not explain why the legislature should not enact law
retroactively.
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have the opportunity to avoid that activity.50 But the ex post facto
protections apply to far more than the category of regulatory
crimes, and virtually no cases have arisen in the regulatory crime
setting.
Stressing notice is even more tenuous in cases challenging leg-
islative decisions to increase punishment, by far the largest cate-
gory of ex post facto challenges. All offenders in such cases know,
or should know, that their conduct is illegal. The only possible reli-
ance or notice issue arises by virtue of the offender's lack of knowl-
edge of the penalty he or she will receive if caught and convicted.
51
Few offenders, however, know or even could know the punishment
that they can expect to receive, and it is doubtful whether that
knowledge should in any event serve as a condition precedent to
increased punishment.
With respect to knowledge, not many actors calculate poten-
tial penalties before they engage in particular prohibited conduct,
or engage in conduct that risks particular prohibited results.
Those intending to rob banks or trade secrets may well be pun-
ished under a myriad of overlapping criminal provisions of both
the federal and state sovereign. Bank robbery might involve an
assault, a trespass, a malicious wounding, as well as distinct fed-
eral offenses. Given the prosecutor's choice of charges, the labyrin-
thine operation of sentencing guidelines and the availability of
complex good time credit programs within prisons, few offenders
are likely to predict with much precision what their actual stay in
prison would be. Any goal to afford fair notice of sentencing provi-
sions, therefore, seems chimerical.
Despite the shaky rationale for notice, rule of law concerns
constitute a more satisfactory explanation. Barring retroactivity
in the criminal context prevents the legislature from singling out
individuals for criminal sanctions in response to news of horrifying
crimes. Because of pressure exerted by contributors or constitu-
ents, legislators may wish to punish offensive behavior that other-
wise would escape punishment based on extant statutes. A
50. Perhaps reliance is also important in mala in se contexts because of the
fear of legislative errors in making the judgment as to what is blameworthy. Yet,
judicial review could help ensure that retroactive application of any new criminal
prohibitions be limited to the mala in se context. See Kahan, supra note 16, at 403.
51. Even then, studies have demonstrated little correlation between the
length of imprisonment and deterrence. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 8
(1996).
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requirement of prospectivity minimizes the possibility that legisla-
tors may use the criminal law to target identifiable individuals or
groups based on prior conduct.52
Furthermore, even if the reliance rationale does not persua-
sively explain why offenders should be on notice of criminal penal-
ties prior to committing anti-social acts, a related rationale exists
for why offenders should be able to rely on the criminal penalties
assessed after the crime has been committed. The Ex Post Facto
Clause arguably advances an interest in repose by forcing the state
to exact one punishment from an offender rather than doling out
penalties one measure at a time. When punishment is prescribed
up front, an offender psychologically might be able to accept what
is due and work toward reintegrating himself into society. A sen-
tence can be viewed as a type of contractual quid pro quo-because
of their breach of society's laws, offenders must serve a number of
years in prison. The contractual model can help an offender accept
the legitimacy of the loss of liberty and therefore aid rehabilitation,
or at least help ensure that the offender will not commit another
crime.
Pushing back the release date after sentencing departs from
the quid pro quo model, potentially tarnishing the legitimacy of the
punishment in the offender's eyes. A system which seemingly ex-
tends incarceration after the fact breeds cynicism and distrust.53
An offender subject to future penalties might not be as able, be-
cause of resentment toward an arbitrary system, to channel his en-
ergies into becoming a functioning contributor to society.54
52. There is undeniably less risk of arbitrary lawmaking when legislators en-
act new provisions to govern conduct in the future as well as that already taking
place. Barring legislative changes that are only retroactive might more narrowly
comport with the principles against retroactive lawmaking. Nonetheless, a ban
against retroactive lawmaking removes the incentive that legislators might other-
wise have to enact new law prospectively only to ensure that identifiable individu-
als receive more punishment for prior conduct. See also infra text accompanying
note 220.
53. Judge Marvin E. Frankel made a similar observation in Criminal
Sentences: Law Without Order 86-102 (1973). Judge Frankel criticized indetermi-
nate sentences in part because prisoners could not understand the standards pa-
role officials used in determining whom to release. The seemingly arbitrary
decision to release some prisoners and not others bred distrust: lilt may be
imagined that knowing the actual length of a prison term might serve (an in-
mate's] . . . searing ... needs." Id. at 97.
54. Ironically, the indeterminate sentencing system, which in part was
designed to rehabilitate the offender, may have impeded rehabilitation. Cf An-
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Thus, even though the reliance justification is questionable,
combined goals of fostering rehabilitation (and preventing recidi-
vism), furthering rule of law concerns and preserving individual
freedom in the mala prohibitum context support the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The ban prevents singling out; limits the role of emotion in
criminal legislation; and may facilitate the offender's ultimate re-
integration into society.
B. Application of Ex Post Facto Clause to Judiciary
The Supreme Court, however, never has applied the Ex Post
Facto Clause to judicial acts. Part of the reason can be attributed
to the language of the Clause, which prohibits both the federal gov-
ernment and the states from passing "any ex post facto Law."55
The terminology strongly suggests no limit on judicial decisions.
The judiciary does not "pass" laws. Judicial decisions may have
the effect of making law, but without the formal power of
enactment.
Moreover, a glance at the historical context provides little rea-
son to apply the Ex Post Facto Clause to judicial acts. The events
likely precipitating enactment of the ex post facto prohibitions fo-
cused on abuses by state legislatures, not judges. The state legisla-
tures in the period under the Articles of Confederation had passed
economic measures-particularly legal tender laws-which
threatened the interests of prominent financial leaders.56 The
English Parliament previously had passed retrospective criminal
measures in political cases.57 The drafters may well have included
the Ex Post Facto Clause therefore to quiet the fears of mercantile
drew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments: Report of the Com-
mittee for the Study of Incarceration 27-32 (1976) (examining the failure of the
indeterminate system to promote rehabilitation); Lynne Goodstein & John
Hepburn, Determinate Sentencing and Imprisonment 18-19 (1976).
55. U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
56. I borrow here from 1 William W. Crosskey & William Jeffrey, Jr., Politics
and the Constitution in the History of the United States 324-51 (1953). Justice
Chase, in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), adverted to parliamentary
history in Great Britain when Parliament had passed laws declaring acts to be
treason that were not when committed and retroactively changed the evidentiary
requirements for proving crimes. Id. at 389.
57. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 389 (1798) (Chase, J.); Joseph Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 677-79 (1833).
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interests as well as proponents of individual liberty.58 The Ex Post
Facto Clause served to prevent either majorities or influential mi-
norities from rashly using the legislative power to disrupt settled
expectations.
Early cases similarly assumed that the Ex Post Facto Clause
did not apply to judicial acts. In Calder v. Bull,59 the ex post facto
challenge arose from the Connecticut legislature's revision of a
state judicial decision in a will contest. The legislature passed a
resolution setting aside the probate court's decision in favor of Mrs.
Calder. The probate court subsequently reconvened and awarded
the land to Mrs. Bull. Mrs. Calder sought relief from Connecticut's
courts and ultimately from the United States Supreme Court, ar-
guing that the legislative decision to set aside the probate court's
judgment violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Calder held that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to
civil contexts. In so doing, three of the four Justices hearing the
case opined in addition that the Clause did not apply to the Con-
necticut legislature's decision because the legislature had acted in
a judicial capacity.60 Justice Iredell stated that the legislature's
exercise of review "as in the present instance ... is an exercise of
judicial not of legislative authority."1 Justice Cushing added that
exercises of judicial authority are not "touched by the federal con-
stitution."62 Justice Paterson added that the judicial nature of the
legislature's act "militates against the plaintiffs in error [because]
58. As a historical matter, therefore, the Clause may well have been intended
to restrain retroactive civil as well as criminal legislation. See Crosskey & Jeffrey,
supra note 56, at 324-25; Story, supra note 57, ch. xxxii, § 679; Jane Harris Aiken,
Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81 Ky. L.J. 323, 324-26
(1992-93); Oliver Field, Ex Post Facto in the Constitution, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 315,
322-31 (1920-21); Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Legis-
lation, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 301 (1996).
Nevertheless, courts currently use rational basis scrutiny in upholding retro-
active legislation in the civil sphere, requiring only that the retroactive effect be
rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See, e.g., Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) ("Provided that the retro-
active application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose fur-
thered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain
within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches.").
59. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
60. The Connecticut legislature had acted as a court of appeals in all cases
until 1762. See id. at 395 (Paterson, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 398 (Iredell, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 400 (Cushing, J., concurring).
19971 JUDICIAL RETROACTIVE LAWMAKING
their counsel has contended for a reversal of the judgment, on the
ground, that the awarding of a new trial was the effect of legisla-
tive act, and that it is unconstitutional, because an ex post facto
law."63 The Supreme Court has adhered to the dicta in Calder in
subsequent cases, holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not
constrain judicial acts.64
II. BourIE AND ITS PROGENY
Whether because of the constitutional text, the dicta in Cal-
der65 or some unarticulated normative view, judicial decisions ex-
panding the reach of criminal provisions or lengthening sentences
have remained immune from scrutiny under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.66 The Supreme Court could not ignore, however, that the
same concerns underlying the Clause can be triggered by judicial
decisions. Because interpretation is not a mechanical exercise, ju-
dicial constructions-particularly of broadly worded texts67-seem
like conventional lawmaking. Judicial interpretations that change
the substantive definition of a crime can imperil liberty to the
same extent as legislative change. Judges presiding over a case
can alter or transmute a legislative provision to ensure that the
conduct of the accused before them falls within the statutory lan-
guage despite the novelty of the interpretation. Similarly, an un-
63. Id. at 396 (Paterson, J., concurring).
64. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 224 (1961) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("[The ex post facto [clause] ... has not ordinarily been thought to apply
to judicial legislation."); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913) (holding that the
Ex Post Facto Clause "is a restraint upon legislative power and concerns the mak-
ing of laws, not their construction by the courts").
65. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
66. In contrast, the Court applied the Contract Clause to judicial acts for a
period in our history, despite the fact that the Contract Clause-like the Ex Post
Facto Clause-is directed at laws passed by the state legislatures. See U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 10. Professor Barton H. Thompson, in an excellent paper, Barton H.
Thompson, The History of the Judicial Impairment "Doctrine' and its Lessons for
the Contract Clause, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (1992), details how federal courts in the
mid-nineteenth century protected individuals from state judicial decisions impair-
ing contractual rights. He argues that, although the Court did not always explic-
itly rely on the Contract Clause, it nevertheless relied on Contract Clause
principles in striking down state judicial decisions that seemingly deprived bond-
holders of the benefit of their contract. In becoming embroiled in the bond contro-
versies in the mid-nineteenth century, the Court recognized that judicial
interference with contractual prerogatives could be just as devastating as legisla-
tion. See id. at 1383-85.
67. See Kahan, supra note 17.
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expected judicial construction of sentencing guidelines can
increase the punishment an offender faces just as in Miller and
Lindsey. Surprising judicial decisions deprive an offender of notice
to the same extent as a new legislative enactment enlarging the
scope of a criminal provision. 68
At the same time, freeing judges from the strictures of the Ex
Post Facto Clause may invite too much judicial power. When con-
fronting the accused's deeds, judges may wish to bend the law to
ensure that the accused is punished severely, whether by including
the objectionable conduct within a criminal enactment or ex-
panding the reach of a sentencing provision. As with legislatures,
judges may be tempted to adapt the law to fit the factual scenario
before them.
Indeed, in comparison to legislative change, a court may well
be more influenced by the specifics of a particular case in reaching
its decision. Although judicial constructions have prospective as
well as retrospective impact, judges may be swayed by the emotion
of the moment to interpret a statute to prevent the release or leni-
ent sentence for a particularly objectionable offender.69 Prevent-
ing retroactive application of judicial changes therefore might
improve judicial craft overall because statutory construction con-
trolling future conduct would not be sullied by any vindictive pur-
pose. Retroactive judicial, as well as legislative, decision-making
in the criminal context poses a substantial risk of arbitrariness.
68. Indeed, the concern for constructive notice may play a larger role in re-
straining judicial, rather than legislative, retroactivity. When the legislature
changes a standard of conduct retroactively, there is no concern for augmenting
the power of police and prosecutors. See supra note 49. In contrast, when judges
fashion a new doctrine and apply it to the case at bar, police and prosecutors as
opposed to legislators have already selected the particular defendant for punish-
ment. In any common law of crimes system, prosecutors and police play a more
important role than with legislatively defined crimes.
69. In recognition of that possibility, the federal sentencing guidelines permit
judges, in circumscribed situations, to depart from the guidelines to increase pun-
ishment for the offender. See United States v. Otis, 107 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Valentine, 100 F.3d 1209 (6th Cir. 1996); cf. Koon v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (1996) ("[The Sentencing Reform Act] allows district
courts to depart from the applicable Guideline range (in cases that feature] 'aggra-
vating . . .circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the .. .Commission.') (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994)). In
the absence of such a safety valve, judges might be tempted to alter construction of
the guidelines themselves to achieve the desired results.
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Furthermore, the rehabilitation goal seemingly does not turn
on whether it is the legislature or the court that imposes the in-
creased punishment. Offenders as in Lynce, who finally believe
that they have crossed the end line and earned release, are not
likely to be able to rationalize reincarceration on the ground that it
was a judicial, as opposed to a legislative, decision to lengthen the
playing field. Indeed, in Lynce, it was not clear whether the rein-
carceration should have been attributed to legislative or judicial
design. If we value certainty to enable offenders to reintegrate
themselves better into society, then that certainty is shattered re-
gardless of whether it is due to legislative or judicial change.
In the last two centuries, the Supreme Court has confronted
the problem posed by unexpected state court decision-making in a
number of contexts. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,70 for instance,
the Court feared that the Virginia Court of Appeals used creative
property law interpretation to deny rights guaranteed individuals
under federal law by treaty. The Court has since exercised the
power to oversee whether unexpected state court interpretations of
state law may deprive individuals of constitutionally protected
rights.71
More specifically, the problem of judicial interpretive changes
has loomed large. As one example, the Court struggled when con-
fronting state judicial legerdemain during the municipal bond cri-
sis of the mid-nineteenth century. 72 Many municipalities could not
afford to pay off bondholders who had funded prior municipal
projects, particularly railroad expansion. Perhaps because many
of the bondholders were non-residents, local judges sided with mu-
nicipalities in attempting to limit municipal debt and altered state
law doctrines to prevent relief. The Court intervened to protect
individuals from the unexpected doctrinal changes. In addition, by
70. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
71. The Due Process Clause presents a good example. In the absence of fed-
eral court review, state courts might construe state law to deny that acts taken by
state governmental officials violated property rights. Federal courts routinely sep-
arate out any state procedural limitations on property rights--irrespective of the
importance the state may attach to them-in determining whether property rights
exist. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (ignoring
procedural limitations set by the state in determining whether state-created prop-
erty entitlement exists); cf Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)
(rejecting the state court determination that no contract had been formed in light
of contract clause protections).
72. See supra note 66.
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the turn of the century, courts had declared that unforeseeable
changes in state judicial interpretations could violate the Takings
Clause. 73
Moreover, courts expressed retroactivity concerns as part of
vagueness analysis. In Lanzetta v. New Jersey,74 for instance, the
defendants challenged their conviction under a New Jersey statute
criminalizing membership in a gang by those who had been con-
victed previously of particular crimes.76 The Court stated that the
term "gang" was too ambiguous to provide sufficient notice: "[no
one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate
as to the meaning of penal statutes."76 The Court, however, noted
that the New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently had provided a
more definite construction of the statutory term. Nonetheless, the
Court dismissed that narrowing construction, reasoning that "lilt
would be hard to hold that, in advance of judicial utterance upon
the subject, [defendants] were bound to understand the challenged
provision according to the language later used by the court."77 Ret-
roactive application of a more precise definition by a court would
not cure the notice problem.78
Full consideration of application of ex post facto principles to
judicial decisions, however, arrived only with the civil rights move-
ment. State court judges resorted to surprising interpretations of
state law to punish protestors and activists. 79 In light of the ensu-
ing friction between federal and state court judges, the Supreme
Court reconsidered whether ex post facto principles should apply
to judicial, as well as legislative, decisions.
73. See Barton H. Thompson, Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1463-64
(1990); cf. Brinkeroff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) (limiting
the ability of litigants to raise takings challenges to judicial acts but considering
the due process challenge).
74. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
75. See id. at 452.
76. Id. at 453.
77. Id. at 456. The Court went on to note that the state supreme court's nar-
rowing construction remained vague. See id.
78. Similarly, in James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), the Court over-
ruled a prior case that had excluded embezzled funds from the reach of the income
tax laws. Nonetheless, in part because the Court had yet to overrule the prior case
at the time of defendant's conviction for tax evasion, it set aside the conviction. Id.
79. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965) (addressing state court
application of procedural requirements during criminal trials); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (addressing new state procedural require-
ments to prevent the NAACP from raising constitutional claims).
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A. Bouie
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,80 the Court reversed a trespass
conviction on the ground that the state conviction rested on an un-
expected construction of the state trespass statute by the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The state supreme court had construed
a trespass statute prohibiting "[elvery entry upon the lands of an-
other ... after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such
entry" to apply to African-American demonstrators at a lunch
counter who entered the lunch counter premises before the owner
asked them to leave.81 Although the Supreme Court noted that
the South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of the statute-
applying it to individuals refusing to leave another's property after
being so requested-was possible, it held that retroactive applica-
tion of the interpretation violated due process because the statute
did not "give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime."8 2
As the Court explained in greater depth:
[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute,
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto
law .... If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto
Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State
Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from
achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.8 3
Given that the state court judges apparently strained to affix some
criminal liability upon the civil rights protestors, prohibiting retro-
active application of unforeseeable judicial constructions may have
had the salutary effect of improving future judicial decision-mak-
ing. South Carolina courts might hesitate before again interpret-
ing criminal provisions merely to ensure punishment for the
offender before the court. Lower courts have extended the
Supreme Court's due process analysis to unforeseeable judicial
80. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
81. See id. at 349.
82. Id. at 350. For a contextual analysis of Bouie as part of the Court's re-
sponse to the civil rights movement, see Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil
Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 Yale L.J. 1520 (1968) and Michael KIarman, An
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 273-76
(1991).
83. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54; see also supra note 19.
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changes in sentencing structure as well,84 making the reach of the
Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses congruent.
Bouie perhaps can be rationalized as part of the Supreme
Court's strategy in the early 1960s sit-in cases of resolving the civil
rights protestors' constitutional challenges on the narrowest basis
possible. The Court decided other sit-in cases on insufficiency of
evidence, applied equal protection, vagueness and first amendment
grounds.8 5 The Court may have stretched to locate some ground
upon which to uphold the defendants' right to integrate the lunch
counter. Whatever the pedigree, however, the Court reaffirmed
the due process rationale in subsequent cases, solidifying Bouie's
position in the legal firmament.
For instance, no civil rights overtones existed in Douglas v.
Buder.8 6 In Douglas, the defendant pled guilty to manslaughter
and received probation. One of the conditions for probation pro-
vided that "[aIll arrests for any reason must be reported without
delay to [defendant's] probation and parole officer."8 7 After a mul-
tiple car crash, police issued the defendant a traffic citation for
driving too fast under existing conditions. The defendant duly in-
formed his probation officer of the accident at their next scheduled
meeting, eleven days later. The state judge, however, subse-
quently decided to revoke the defendant's probation on the ground
that he had failed to report his "arrest" promptly. A divided state
supreme court upheld the trial court's construction of "arrest."8 8
The United States Supreme Court subsequently reversed, reason-
ing in part that, even if Missouri henceforth defined a traffic cita-
tion "to be the equivalent of an arrest, . . . the unforeseeable
application of that interpretation in the case before us deprived pe-
titioner of due process."89 Bouie thus has become enshrined in our
law.
84. See, e.g., Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1989); Knapp v. Card-
well, 667 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982); Foster v. Barbour, 613 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1980).
85. See Greenberg, supra note 82, at 1528-31.
86. 412 U.S. 430 (1973).
87. Id. at 430.
88. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Buder, 485 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1972).
89. Douglas, 412 U.S. at 432.
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B. Impact of Bouie
To help assess the impact of Bouie, I surveyed the number of
published cases addressing and granting Bouie-type claims in
1976, 1986 and 1996. I selected those years to get a sense of the
judicial receptivity to due process claims based on Bouie. The re-
sults reveal a consistent judicial hostility to Bouie claims, and sug-
gest that the Bouie doctrine has attained little practical
significance, even as the Supreme Court has continued to impose
significant restraints on legislatures under the ex post facto
doctrine.
First, successful Bouie claims are few and far between. The
United States Supreme Court has not upheld any Bouie claim for
the past twenty years.90 Consider the most recent Bouie challenge
raised in United States v. Lanier,91 decided in the same term as
Lynce. Prosecutors alleged that the defendant state court judge as-
saulted several women in judicial chambers. They charged him
with violating a civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 242, on the ground
that he had deprived the victims of "rights and privileges which
are secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, namely the right not to be deprived of liberty with-
out due process of law, including the right to be free from wilful
sexual assault."92 After conviction, the defendant appealed, argu-
ing that the federal statute did not criminalize sexual assaults by
state officials, and that, if it did, then retroactive application of
that novel interpretation violated his due process rights. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with him and set aside the
conviction, reasoning that "[t]he indictment in this case for a previ-
ously unknown, undeclared and undefined constitutional crime
cannot be allowed to stand."93
In reversing, the Supreme Court did not take issue with the
defendant's assertion that application of the civil rights statute to
sexual assault was entirely novel. Yet the Court held that novelty
was not the key; rather, it stated that the "touchstone is whether
the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reason-
ably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was
90. The last decision was Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (barring
retroactive application of new obscenity standards).
91. 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
92. Id. at 1223 (quoting the trial court indictment).
93. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996).
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criminal."94 The Court counseled that, in considering whether the
conduct's criminality was "reasonably clear," the Court itself need
not have considered a similar claim, nor need it identify any lower
court precedents involving substantially similar facts. Indeed, the
Court clarified that criminal liability can attach merely if, "in light
of preexisting law, the unlawfulness [under the Constitution is] ap-
parent."95 The Court accordingly remanded the case to the court of
appeals for application of the new standard. Even if sexual mis-
conduct by a judge or similar official had never been considered a
violation of a constitutional right, the defendant could be con-
victed. Thus, the current burden on defendants to demonstrate a
Bouie violation is quite substantial.
Aside from the dim prospect of prevailing on a Bouie claim in
the Supreme Court, an admittedly imperfect survey further
reveals the ostensible dearth of successful Bouie claims. In 1996,
only two challenges relying on Bouie succeeded in the nation's en-
tire legal system in addition to the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Lanier.96 Three successful challenges occurred in 1986,97 and two
in 1976.98 The consistency is surprising. For the past twenty
years, virtually no Bouie claims have been successful. In contrast,
at least eleven successful ex post facto challenges occurred in
198699 as well as twenty-three in 1996.100
94. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1225.
95. Id. at 1228 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
96. See People v. Farley, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 702 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Snyder,
673 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1996). The limited number of successful claims is particularly
significant given that there were twenty-six cases reported in which Bouie claims
were raised, and likely many more cases that were not reported. In 1995, for the
sake of comparison, there were no successful reported Bouie claims.
97. See State v. McGann, 506 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1986); State v. Anonymous, 516
A.2d 156 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); State v. Doe, 717 P.2d 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
In comparison, there were six successful claims the prior year. See Moore v. Wy-
rick, 766 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Reed v. Lane, 759 F.2d
618 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Yonan, 622 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Ex
parte Alexander, 475 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 1985); People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380 (Cal.
1985); People v. Martin, 184 Cal. Rptr. 346 (Ct. App. 1985).
98. See People v. Dempster, 242 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1976); Riggs v. Branch,
554 P.2d 823 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). For the sake of comparison, there were
three successful claims in 1975. See United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1975); State v.
George, 362 N.E.2d 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
99. See Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Beahn v.
State, 499 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Harris v. State, 498 So. 2d 1371,
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Maldonado v. State, 498 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
19971 JUDICIAL RETROACTIVE LAWMAKING 59
Second, all of the successful due process claims in 1996 and
1986 challenged state trial court interpretations on appeal in the
state court systems, although successful challenges to state court
rulings have occurred in federal court as well.101 A number of vari-
ables may account for the greater likelihood of success in challeng-
ing state, as opposed to federal, convictions. As an initial matter,
state trial courts are more politicized than their federal counter-
parts.10 2 State appellate and federal courts therefore may be more
suspicious of novel state trial court interpretations that disadvan-
tage an accused. Moreover, state courts in general have been more
hospitable to challenges to retroactive decisions in the civil, as well
as criminal, context.10 3 Although most criminal cases are tried in
1986); Morganti v. State, 498 So. 2d 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); McDowell v.
State, 491 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Signorelli v. State, 491 So. 2d 349
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Taylor v. State, 351 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986);
State v. McKinstry, 722 P.2d 738 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Ex parte Bonham, 707
S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Short, 350 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1986).
100. See United States v. Graika, 103 F.3d 134 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Stover, 93 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beals, 87 F.3d 854 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. McLamb, 77 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Rosario, No. 96-5103, 1996 WL 583187 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1996); Roe v. Office of
Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1996); Keating v. Hood, 922 F. Supp.
1482 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Eichel-
berger v. State, 916 S.W.2d 109 (Ark. 1996); People v. Snook, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 630
(Ct. App. 1996); People v. Helms, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Ct. App. 1996); People v.
Washington, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024
(Kan. 1996); State v. Morgan, 686 So. 2d 1048 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Lee v. State, 681
So. 2d 1020 (La. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Calhoun, 669 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App.
1996); Puckett v. Abels, 684 So. 2d 671 (Miss. 1996); State v. Cookman, 920 P.2d
1086 (Or. 1996); State v. Gleason, 673 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Christen-
son v. Thompson, 923 P.2d 1316 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Meadows v. Schiedler, 924
P.2d 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Bollinger v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervi-
sion, 920 P.2d 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); In re J.M., 685 A.2d 185 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996); Goodman v. State, 935 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); Ieppert v. State,
No. 05-91-00084-CR, 1996 WL 547968 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1996); Johnson v.
State, 930 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Bowers v. State, 914 S.W.2d 213
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
101. See supra note 98.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 226-34.
103. Unlike in the federal system, see infra text accompanying notes 195-202,
state courts continue to overrule precedents without applying the new ruling to the
case at bar. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 696 So. 2d 290 (Ala.
1996); Presley v. Mississippi Highway Comm'n, 608 So. 2d 1288 (Miss. 1992);
Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996); Vetter v. North Dakota
Workers Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1996); Rivers v. State, 889 P.2d 288
(Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Kincaid v. Magnum, 432 S.E.2d 74 (W. Va. 1993); Colby v.
Columbia County, 550 N.W.2d 124 (Wis. 1996).
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state courts, there has been a recent proliferation of federal crimi-
nal enactments, many with broadly worded provisions. 10 4 None-
theless, the Bouie doctrine practically is moribund at the federal
level, the Sixth Circuit decision in Lanier notwithstanding-fed-
eral judicial decisions can be applied retroactively whether in the
civil 10 5 or criminal context,10 6 free from significant due process
scrutiny.
C. Limiting Bouie
Courts have applied the due process check against judicial ret-
roactivity far more leniently than the ex post facto check against
legislative retroactivity. The difference can be seen in judicial
cases reconfiguring common law doctrines such as criminal de-
fenses, as well as in judicial decisions construing legislative
commands.
1. Change in Common Law Doctrines
Judges fashion criminal law doctrine in a variety of contexts.
Whether general federal common law exists today is a matter of
dispute.' 07 But what is not controverted is that courts enjoy sub-
stantial leeway in formulating criminal defenses and interpreting
such doctrines as causation. The judicial process itself contem-
plates that precedents evolve over time. With new fact patterns,
the need to clarify or even reevaluate prior opinions arises. A
strict application of ex post facto doctrine accordingly might stul-
tify decision-making in the criminal context. Courts rarely have
held that a change in common law doctrines violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause.
For instance, consider the facts in a recent notorious Florida
manslaughter trial. Several young adults were charged with man-
slaughter stemming from the uprooting of a stop sign from a
104. See Kahan, supra note 16.
105. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 195-202, all new
interpretations in the civil context must be applied retroactively in the federal
system.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 199-200.
107. See Kahan, supra note 16 (arguing that federal common law in the crimi-
nal context is widespread today given the open-ended delegations from courts).
The Supreme Court, however, is convinced to the contrary, stating emphatically
only recently that "[t]ederal crimes are defined by Congress, not the courts."
United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 n.6 (1997).
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county intersection. Within thirty-six hours after numerous stop
signs had been displaced, a truck rumbled through an intersection
which previously had a stop sign, causing a fatal accident. The
lack of a stop sign unquestionably played a role in the deaths. To
convict, however, the court and the jury had to conclude that the
uprooting of the stop sign "caused" the ensuing car crash. Causa-
tion is a critical element of any criminal offense.108
Causation in Florida, as elsewhere, generally is linked to fore-
seeability. Florida precedent suggests that, even when defendant's
conduct is the cause-in-fact of another's death, the court will not
find causation "where the prohibited result of the defendant's con-
duct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the danger cre-
ated by the defendant's conduct, or where it would otherwise be
unjust, based on fairness and policy considerations." 10 9 A traffic
fatality certainly may result from theft of a stop sign, but it is
hardly likely. Someone might have noted the absence of the sign
and called the county for a replacement; someone might have
called the county after a fender-bender or near miss; or no accident
may ever have occurred. Thirty-four motorists reportedly told au-
thorities that they had noticed that the stop sign was not standing
on the day of the accident. 110 In addition, neighbors during the
trial reported that the stop sign had fallen intermittently in the
past."' Moreover, the young adults admitted stealing eighteen
other signs with nary a mishap reported. Road sign theft is appar-
ently such a common problem that, when potential jurors in the
case were asked if they had ever taken a sign, half of them raised a
hand. 112 Presumably, a fatality does not result every time county
authorities are remiss in failing to install stop signs where needed
or in ensuring that such signs remain visible.
108. Florida, like other states, requires that causation be proven as an essen-
tial element of the prosecution's case. See, e.g., Golden v. State, 629 So. 2d 109
(Fla. 1993) (overturning the defendant's conviction of murder because of insuffi-
cient evidence of causation).
109. Velasquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
110. See Bruce Frankel et al., Dead Stop for Three Friends, People Magazine,
July 7, 1997, at 65, available in 1997 WL 8505229.
111. See Mike Clary, For Fallen Stop Sign, Vandals Face Life, L.A. Times, June
11, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 2219054.
112. See id.
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Assuming that Florida had no precedent on point, and none is
evident, 113 the court's conclusion that causation was met on the
facts of this case may well have marked a departure from prior
case law. Retroactive application of a legislative change in the cau-
sation requirement unquestionably would violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Nonetheless, few defendants likely would even con-
sider raising a Bouie-type claim to challenge trial courts' applica-
tion of the causation requirement because they know that common
law precedents evolve and that judges zealously guard that
tradition.
In addition to the causation issue discussed above, state courts
have fashioned other common law doctrines to resolve criminal
cases, including those defining the actus reus of the crime 114 as
well as defenses such as diminished capacity. 115 Although compar-
atively little common lawmaking exists today, state courts well
into this century continued to define new crimes on a common law
basis. 116 Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court in 1994 decided
that the State could prosecute Jack Kevorkian under a common
law prohibition of assisted suicide." 7 Each common lawmaking ef-
113. Florida courts had previously articulated a relatively demanding test for
causation. See, e.g., Velazquez, 561 So. 2d 347 (holding that the defendant, who
participated in drag race with the victim, was not a "cause" of the victim's death
from an ensuing crash). Similarly, in Todd v. State, 594 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992), the court found that the defendant's theft from a collection plate at
church was not the legal cause of the victim's death. Witnessing the theft, the
victim chased the defendant and suffered cardiac arrest. The court concluded that
"the petty theft did not encompass the kind of direct, foreseeable risk of physical
harm that would support a conviction of manslaughter." Id. at 806; see also Pen-
ton v. State, 548 So. 2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the victim's
death during a chase of a bicycle thief cannot be attributed to the thief).
114. See infra notes 116-17.
115. For instance, in Mauppin v. State, 831 S.W.2d 104 (Ark. 1992), the
Supreme Court of Arkansas considered whether to apply its decision abrogating
the common law defense of self-induced intoxication. The court held that "[alan
accused is entitled to any defense that existed at the time of the commission of the
crime, even if that defense was based only on a court's erroneous interpretation of
the law." Id. at 112. The Arkansas court's view has not been charitably received by
other courts. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
116. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955)
(creating the crime of making obscene telephone calls).
117. See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (fashioning the
crime of aiding and abetting suicide). The court relied on a savings statute, which
provided in part that "[a]ny person who shall commit any indictable offense at the
common law ... shall be guilty of a felony." Id. at 739 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 750.505 (West 1991) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.773 (Callahan 1982)). The court
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fort could violate ex post facto principles by failing to provide no-
tice of the relevant doctrine. Most courts, however, have rejected
applicability of ex post facto principles.118 Judicial changes are
permitted that would be invalidated if made by the legislature.
In short, the Florida stop sign case suggests that alterations to
common law doctrines apply retroactively, despite the fact that
comparable legislative changes would be proscribed by the Ex Post
Facto Clause. The common law system presupposes a measure of
evolution that is incompatible with stringent application of ex post
facto principles, even when judges overtly act in a lawmaking ca-
pacity. Unless the common law development represents a marked
departure from precedent, retroactive application is permitted. As
the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. Burnom,119 Bouie
does not apply "to the resolution of uncertainty that marks any
evolving legal system."120
2. Statutory Interpretation
Judicial alteration of common law doctrines affecting culpabil-
ity is relatively rare. In contrast, courts routinely apply new inter-
pretations of statutory language to criminal defendants appearing
before them, even when those interpretations are not dictated by
the plain language of the statutory provision. Ex post facto princi-
ples seldom prevent courts from arriving at novel interpretations
of statutory terms or from changing prior interpretations of the
statutory language.
rejected an ex post facto attack on the ground that, under a fifty-year old prece-
dent, Kevorkian could have been convicted of murder, and thus could not complain
about the new theory of liability. See id.
118. Courts on occasion, however, have held that retroactive common law
changes would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. For instance, in People v. Steven-
son, 331 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1982), the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the
common law "year and a day" rule, which provided that the death of a person
which occurred more than a year and day after injury could not be linked to the
earlier injury. Id. The court reasoned that "[ilt would be nothing if not erratic to
declare for the first time.., almost five years after the year and a day rule effec-
tively barred a murder prosecution in this case, that such a prosecution could be
maintained." Id. at 149. Nonetheless, other courts have permitted retroactive ap-
plication. See State v. Sandridge, 365 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio Misc. 1977) (applying ret-
roactively the abrogation of the year and a day rule); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 166
A.2d 501 (Pa. 1960) (same).
119. 27 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 1994).
120. Id. at 284.
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a. Limitation of Foreseeability Requirement
Courts have latched onto foreseeability as the key to the Bouie
inquiry, upholding judicial alterations in statutory interpretation
as long as the changes were foreseeable. The foreseeability inquiry
tracks the traditional distinction between legislative and judicial
action. When courts make law, retroactive application should be
as unjust as in the legislative context, but when courts rather en-
gage in the evolutionary interpretive process, their decisions are
foreseeable, and thus should be applied retroactively without con-
cern for the individual's rights at stake.
All interpretations not dictated by precedent can be less
favorable than those anticipated or desired by an offender. Courts
obviously cannot be constrained by the subjective expectation of
offenders as to how the law will be applied. An objective standard
of foreseeability must govern instead.
Consider, for instance, the Fifth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Zuniga.121 In Zuniga, the defendant challenged his con-
viction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which penalizes any defendant
who "during and in relation to any... drug trafficking crime...
uses or carries a firearm." Zuniga asserted that his conduct fell
outside the statutory language because he did not "use" a firearm,
but rather attempted to barter drugs for firearms. 122 From the
language of the provision, the defendant's argument was quite
compelling. Receiving a firearm in trade cannot be equated with
its use. Had Zuniga consulted the statutory text, therefore, he had
sound reason to believe that he would not be punished under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
However, the Fifth Circuit previously had signaled an intent
to construe "use" broadly as a term of art. In United States v.
Blake,123 the court stated that the statutory language was satisfied
if the "weapon involved could have been used to protect, facilitate,
or have the potential of facilitating the operation, and the presence
of the weapon was in some way connected with the drug traffick-
ing."1 24 Anyone familiar with Blake, therefore, might have antici-
pated the extension of its reasoning to cover a barter situation.
121. 18 F.3d 1254 (5th Cir. 1994).
122. Id. at 1257.
123. 941 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1991).
124. Id. at 342.
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Though in no way preordained, the Zuniga court's rationale was
objectively foreseeable through the lens of precedent, even if not
necessarily foreseeable from the statutory language itself. Indeed,
the Supreme Court later upheld the Fifth Circuit's position. 125 If
the judicial interpretation can be anticipated from an objective per-
spective, then the judicial act does not violate the Due Process
Clause. 126 The offender, in other words, is not entitled to rely on
his or her own subjective expectations as to how the statutes
prohibiting certain conduct and imposing punishment operate.
Particular judicial decisions can be anticipated if one considers the
language of the statute (where applicable), dicta from prior opin-
ions, precedent from other jurisdictions and prior administrative
interpretation.
The stress on foreseeable judicial changes marks a critical de-
parture from the Court's ex post facto jurisprudence because so
many judicial changes can be, and have been, viewed as foresee-
able. No comparable foreseeability analysis applies to legislatures
even though legislation also is preceded by a mixture of events.
Journalistic exposes, bills introduced into the legislature, commit-
tee reports and developments in other jurisdictions all signal that
legislative change may be forthcoming.
For example, prior to enactment of the federal sentencing
guidelines 127 or various state truth-in-sentencing laws, 128 change
125. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
126. The change in Zuniga was thus foreseeable because of the prior decision
suggesting a broad interpretation of "use."
127. Legislation to create a Sentencing Commission was first introduced in
Congress by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) in 1975. S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1975. In that same period, numerous articles and books explored the need
for sentencing reform. See, e.g., American Friends Service Comm., Struggle for
Justice: A Report on Crime and Punishment in America (1971); Frankel, supra
note 53, at 103-24; Von Hirsch, supra note 54. Minnesota first experimented with
a determinate sentencing system five years later. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing
Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 727 (1991). The congres-
sional committees' various debates and bills during the 1975-1984 period were
widely noted in the press. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
28 Wake Forest L. Rev, 223 (1993) (assessing the ten years of legislative activity
culminating in the passage of the federal sentencing guidelines).
128. The Illinois truth-in-sentencing law was signed in August, 1995. See Pub.
Act No. 89-404, § 40. The measure principally limits the options that certain cate-
gories of prisoners previously enjoyed for early release.
The informed observer in Illinois could well have predicted legislation in that
direction. The state legislature had enacted several revisions starting in 1973
1997]
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was in the air. In Lynce itself, given the volatility in Florida's
prison system, it may well have been foreseeable that Florida's leg-
islature would revisit the question of affording administrative gain
time credits. Informed observers may not have been able to predict
the precise statutory language ultimately enacted, but they could
have predicted the direction that the legislature would take. Leg-
islation, like precedents, evolves over time, and some areas-such
as penalties for insider trading129 and tax legislation' 3 0-are re-
designed to make sentences more predictable. See Pub. Act. No. 77-2097. Addi-
tional clarifications were added in 1978, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1992 and 1994. See
Gregory W. O'Reilly, Truth in Sentencing: Illinois Adds Yet Another Layer of "Re-
form' to Its Complicated Code of Corrections, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 986, 999-1000
(1996). Enhancements for gang involvement were passed in 1989, 1993, 1994 and
again in 1995. See id. at 1004-05. The legislature also cut back the availability of
certain good time credits in 1993. See id. at 1010-11. Given the national trend
toward truth in sentencing laws, see, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Combatting Violent
Crime: 24 Recommendations to Strengthen Criminal Justice 7-10 (July 28, 1992),
and given congressionally provided incentives, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13702 (1994)
(authorizing grants to states that meet federal standards in meeting truth-in-sen-
tencing laws), the 1995 change cannot be considered surprising.
129. For instance, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, after years of debate
within and without Congress. Congress tinkered with the statute of limitations
several years later in response to controversy generated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350
(1991). See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994). Congress once more addressed the area in
1995, carving out certain categories of insider trading from the purview of RICO.
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737.
130. For instance, Congress has constantly tinkered with the tax rules for de-
preciating business and investment property. Since the 1954 Code, major or minor
changes have appeared in several statutes. See, e.g., Small Business Job Protection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98
Stat. 494; Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365;
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097;
Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669; Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1981 Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635; Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-6000, 92 Stat. 2763; Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat.
3174; Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520; Revenue Act of
1971, Pub. Law. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497; Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, 83 Stat. 487; Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960; Technical
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vised frequently. Thus, foreseeability by itself does not distinguish
the judicial from the legislative context.
b. Malleability of Foreseeability Inquiry
Perhaps more importantly, courts have construed the objective
foreseeability requirement quite laxly. Courts have considered a
wide range of factors in determining that a judicial change was
foreseeable, stressing the ambiguity of a statute or regulation, 13 1
precedents from other jurisdictions, 3 2 prior administrative inter-
pretation of the statute' 33 and whether the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari in a similar case.13 4 No one indicator is disposi-
tive, leaving wide room for the courts to deny a Bouie challenge.
Courts, in other words, have acted as if judges almost never make
new law, but rather as though each new interpretation had been
foreshadowed by prior developments in the common law system.
For instance, in State v. Mummey,' 3 5 the defendant assaulted
a man outside a bar in part by bludgeoning him with tennis shoes.
Under the pertinent assault statute, the defendant could only be
convicted if he used a weapon, which was defined as an instrument
"readily capable of being used to produce death or serious bodily
injury."13 6 The court held that tennis shoes so qualified, and that
the defendant should have anticipated such a construction of the
statute. The conclusion of foreseeability is perplexing-tennis
shoes in the public eye are not weapons, let alone "readily capable
of being used to produce death or serious bodily injury." An ex-
plicit legislative amendment of the statute to expand the definition
of weapon would be barred under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Consider as well the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lustgarden v.
Gunter.13 7 In Lustgarden, the court rejected a prisoner's due pro-
Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606. We all should be on
notice that the depreciation rules may change again.
131. See McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1989).
132. See Hagan v. Caspari, 50 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 1995); State v. Mummey, 871
P.2d 868 (Mont. 1994).
133. See, e.g., Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1992).
134. See United States v. Russotti, 780 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
that the change in the interpretation of the criminal statute was foreseeable be-
cause the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in a case raising a similar inter-
pretive question before the defendant had committed the crime).
135. 871 P.2d 868.
136. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(76) (1994).
137. 966 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1992).
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cess challenge to the Colorado Supreme Court's construction of a
parole statute that limited parole opportunities for certain sexual
offenders. The statute targeted "any person sentenced for convic-
tion of a sex offense, as defined in section 16-13-202(5) ... [and]
any person sentenced as a habitual offender."' 38 The Colorado Pa-
role Board had construed that statute to apply to habitual offend-
ers and only those sexual offenders sentenced under the Sex
Offenders Act, of which section 16-13-202(5) was a part.'3 9 The
state supreme court later disagreed, however, reading the statute
to cover anyone convicted of any charge within the broader cate-
gory of sexual offenses. 14o The Tenth Circuit conceded an ambigu-
ity in the statute, namely whether the reference to section 16-13-
202(5) was intended to limit the impact to those convicted under
the Sexual Offenders Act or rather, as the state supreme court de-
termined, just to furnish a definition of "sex offense." The federal
court held, however, that the state supreme court's change was not
unforeseeable given that it accorded with the most logical con-
struction of the statute. Perhaps so, but it seems to blink reality to
suggest that an inmate is not entitled to rely upon the official ar-
ticulated position of the state parole authority with respect to the
construction of a statute that it is charged with administering. In
any event, if the legislature had enacted the change wrought by
the state supreme court, then retroactive application would have
been blocked by the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The argument against foreseeable change is likely greatest
when courts explicitly overrule precedent. In that context, courts
act more overtly like legislatures in changing the law directly.
Although some statutory interpretation is less foreseeable than
overruling precedent, one would have thought that criminal de-
fendants were entitled to rely on existing case law, as they are en-
titled to rely on existing legislation. Courts, however, have held
that reversal of prior case law does not necessarily make the deci-
sion unforeseeable.
In Dale v. Haeberlin,141 the Sixth Circuit rejected a due pro-
cess challenge to the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Dale v.
138. Id. at 554 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(a) (1989)).
139. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (1989).
140. See Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1990).
141. 878 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1989).
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Commonwealth,142 which upheld the prosecution's use of the same
felony both to prove underlying guilt (felon in possession of a
weapon charge) and then to enhance his sentence for armed rob-
bery as a persistent felony offender. The Sixth Circuit acknowl-
edged that Dale overruled a prior Kentucky Supreme Court
decision, but concluded that the offender had fair warning that his
sentence for robbery could have been twenty-five years, even if the
same prior felony could not have been used at the time to establish
one charge and enhance the other. Whether Dale could have antic-
ipated a twenty-five year sentence or not, however, is beside the
point. He arguably should not have anticipated the state supreme
court's abrupt change as to whether the same prior felony could be
used both at the liability and enhancement stages. Certainly, the
Ex Post Facto Clause would have blocked retroactive application of
any legislative overruling' 43 of the prior Kentucky Supreme Court
decision.'"
142. 715 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1986).
143. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937) (holding that the Ex Post
Facto Clause was violated if the sentence, even if possible under the old sentencing
framework, was likely more severe because of the sentencing change); Kring v.
Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause bars retroac-
tive application of repeal of the rule treating conviction for a lesser included of-
fense as an acquittal of greater offense).
144. More generally, courts have held that litigants should anticipate that
courts will overrule prior precedents from lower courts. For instance, in Hagan v.
Caspari, 50 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 1995), the petitioner argued that the Missouri
Supreme Court's rejection of his double jeopardy claim was unforeseeable. He had
been charged both with second degree robbery for forcibly grabbing the keys to a
van and then for stealing the van. See id. at 544. He argued that the two crimes
merged because of Missouri's single larceny xule, which defined the stealing of sev-
eral articles of property during the same scheme or course of conduct as a single
offense under section 570.050 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. See id. at 546.
Under similar facts, a Missouri appellate court had found that conviction on both a
robbery and theft charge would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See State v.
Lewis, 633 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Therefore, the petitioner argued that,
in overruling the appellate court's interpretation of Missouri's larceny statute, the
state supreme court violated Bouie. See Hagan, 50 F.3d at 547.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that the change was foreseeable largely
because the appellate court's reasoning was plainly wrong. See id. at 546-47. The
larceny statute may have prevented conviction on two separate stealing charges,
but not for the distinct robbery and theft charges. Thus, the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not bar conviction of the two charges. The court further commented
that "[wle have some doubt whether a state supreme court's overruling of an inter-
mediate appellate court decision ever can constitute a change in state law for due
process purposes." Id. at 547.
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In United States v. Rodgers,'145 the United States Attorney
charged the defendant with making a false statement to the FBI
and Secret Service in a "matter within the jurisdiction of any de-
partment or agency of the United States."146 The defendant alleg-
edly apprised the FBI that his wife was involved in a plot to
assassinate the President and that she had been kidnaped. 147 The
defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of a prior
Eighth Circuit decision that construed the language "within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency" to refer only to areas in
which the agency had the power to make final or binding determi-
nations, such as for monetary awards. 148 On that authority, the
district court and Eighth Circuit dismissed the indictment because
the defendant's comments merely triggered a criminal
investigation. 149
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language
"within the jurisdiction of any department or agency" was to be
read broadly, including any matters pertaining to criminal investi-
gations. 150 The defendant argued, however, that the more expan-
sive construction, even if adopted, could not be applied to him
retroactively given his reliance on the prior Eighth Circuit prece-
dents.151 The Supreme Court disagreed due to "the existence of
conflicting cases from other courts of appeals [which] made review
of that issue by this Court.. . reasonably foreseeable." 152 The un-
doing of a precedent, therefore, may be foreseeable. 153 Defendants
145. 466 U.S. 475 (1984).
146. Id. at 476 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
147. See id. at 476. He evidently made the statement in order to recruit the
FBI into helping him find his wife, who had fled their relationship. See id. at 477.
148. Id. at 477-78 (citing Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.
1967) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)).
149. United States v. Rodgers, 706 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1983).
150. Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479.
151. See id. at 484.
152. Id. The limits of the Court's analysis are not apparent. The Court itself,
for example, recently agreed to rehear and revise the results in a case it had de-
cided ten years previously. See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (overrul-
ing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)). No precedent, therefore, is sacrosanct.
153. The Ninth Circuit has held that defendants may not rely upon any judicial
opinion that is subject to rehearing on review or certiorari. See United States v.
Ruiz, 935 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendants were not entitled to
rely on a prior appellate opinion which was withdrawn by the Ninth Circuit after
the plea agreement had been reached); United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that defendants could not rely upon the fact that federal sen-
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may not be entitled to rely on the construction of a statute adopted
by an appellate court because those precedents can always be
overturned.
The Rodgers and Dale courts may have stretched foreseeabil-
ity analysis in recognition of the fact that precedents at times flatly
misstate legislative intent. Why deny courts the ability to rectify
errors wherever possible? The Seventh Circuit, for instance, has
emphasized that the fact "[tihat courts have rendered decisions
later deemed erroneous by higher authority does not entitle crimi-
nal defendants to the benefits of these mistakes."154 However, leg-
islation as in Lynce may be "wrong" as well, and in the civil context
the Court has supported legislative retroactivity to correct past
mistakes. 155 Nonetheless, unlike in the civil context, criminal de-
fendants are entitled to rely upon the "mistakes" of prior legisla-
tively fashioned law. Rodgers suggests that offenders should be
able to foresee that courts will overrule precedents in a variety of
contexts, but evidently not-in light of the Court's application of
the Ex Post Facto Clause-that legislatures periodically will re-
view criminal statutes.
The foreseeability inquiry therefore has been manipulated
substantially. Courts have rationalized that litigants should have
expected the new or changed judicial interpretation. The more a
judicial decision was foreseeable, the more that it fits within the
evolutionary framework of the common law as opposed to legisla-
tion.156 Courts have sufficient leeway to permit retroactive appli-
tencing guidelines had been invalidated within the circuit at time of sentencing,
because the guidelines were later reinstated by the Supreme Court).
154. United States v. Burnom, 27 F.3d 283, 284 (7th Cir. 1994).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); Fleming v. Rhodes,
331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947); Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940);
see also Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Ret-
roactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 703-06 (1960) (describing the courts'
approval of retroactive civil legislation to cure prior mistakes).
156. Professor Jill Fisch's theory of equilibrium is similar. See Jill E. Fisch,
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055
(1997). She argues that most common lawmaking-as opposed to legislation-
should be considered foreseeable because the common law reflects an unstable
equilibrium that can be moved with the slightest tug in any direction. Thus, liti-
gants cannot justifiably rely on any particular common law position. The only ex-
ception she notes is for when the Supreme Court overturns its own precedents. See
id. at 1107-08. In that context, adjudication more closely resembles legislation and
may disrupt a stable equilibrium upon which litigants are entitled to rely. See id.
at 1108. But see supra note 152.
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cation of new statutory interpretation in the criminal context by
dint of the foreseeability analysis. Unexpected construction of
statutory language can ex post be justified on the basis of the gen-
eral evolution of the common law.
c. The Lack of Salience of the Foreseeability Inquiry
Aside from problems of malleability, however, the foreseeabil-
ity inquiry is troubling for a more fundamental reason. Whether a
new judicial interpretation is expected or foreseeable seems
strangely unrelated to the purposes underlying the ex post facto
doctrine.
First, concerns for reliance are as dubious in the judicial crimi-
nal lawmaking context as they are with retroactive criminal legis-
lation generally.' 5 7 Defendants generally do not rely on existing
judicial interpretations when deciding whether to undertake cer-
tain actions. The defendant in Mummey unlikely acquainted him-
self with the vagaries of the assault statute prior to his inebriated
brawl, and the defendants in the stop sign case did not rely on the
existing legal framework before engaging in the pranks. The civil
rights protestors in Bouie likely had consulted the law prior to the
sit-in, but their very purpose in conducting the sit-in was to pro-
voke a response from police authorities. Similarly, offenders rarely
consult sentencing provisions prior to committing anti-social acts.
The defendant in Lynce in no way relied on the good time credit
system prior to committing his offense. Given the arcana of sen-
tencing provisions and the unpredictability of good time credit pro-
visions, few defendants can know the precise range of penalties
prior to committing anti-social acts. 158
Moreover, even if individuals and firms relied on existing law
prior to acting, there is little reason to encourage reliance when the
conduct is plainly blameworthy as in Mummey.' 5 9 The defendant
in Mummey knew-contingent on his level of inebriation-that re-
157. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
158. Even if some defendants calculate the range of penalties prior to under-
taking anti-social acts, we may not wish to protect that kind of cost-benefit
analysis.
159. See also Warner v. Zent, 997 F.2d 116, 127 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that
statutes prohibiting unauthorized transfers of a "draft.. . or other written instru-
ment" foreseeably include a wire transfer). But see Keeler v. Superior Court, 470
P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (barring application of unforeseeable judicial construction of a
homicide statute which would have included fetus as "human being").
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peatedly hitting someone with a tennis shoe was wrongful even if
he was not aware that a tennis shoe could be considered a weapon
under the terms of the assault statute. Similarly, the defendant in
Zuniga recognized that drug trafficking was wrongful, irrespective
of the amount of punishment he ultimately would receive. 160
When the judicial change expands the reach of a mala prohib-
itum or regulatory crime, the case for foreseeability is stronger.
Bouie would be exemplary had the trespass not been part of an
orchestrated civil rights campaign, because the protestors argua-
bly committed no inherently wrongful act by remaining in the store
after being asked to leave. Notice protects only the private order-
ing that society hopes to encourage. If courts alter their construc-
tion of an environmental regulation, then businesses should be
afforded notice to enable them to steer clear of the prohibitions.
Thus, from a reliance perspective, the fact that courts have
manipulated the foreseeability inquiry under Bouie should not be
lamented, except in the mala prohibitum context. Yet, it is difficult
to reconcile the courts' treatment of judicial foreseeability with
their stress on reliance in the legislative retroactivity context. One
would think that, if courts discarded the reliance rationale in one
context, then they would do so in the other.
Second, the foreseeability inquiry in Bouie is also unrelated to
the offenders' conceivable interest in repose. Irrespective of
whether change in interpretation of parole or good time credit pro-
visions is foreseeable, permitting additional increments in punish-
ment transgresses the offenders' interest in repose. Bouie and its
progeny thus do not further any rehabilitative (or anti-recidivist)
notion. Offenders cannot rely on one certain measure of
punishment.
160. Moreover, there is something quite circular about the foreseeability prong
applied to judicial changes in criminal statutes-the change is foreseeable as long
as the individual has reason to know that judges may change their minds. In the
tax context, the Supreme Court in United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292
(1981), stated that '[nobody has a vested right in the rate of taxation, which may
be retroactively changed at the will of Congress." Id. at 298 (quoting Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.)). Similarly, increased
frequency of changed interpretations in the criminal context would undermine any
due process claim on the ground that the individual was not entitled to rely on the
interpretation embraced in any judicial opinion. The foreseeability inquiry begs
the question of whether offenders should be able to rely on judicial construction of
criminal enactments.
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Instead of protecting reliance interests or fostering rehabilita-
tion, however, the foreseeability analysis may further rule of law
values in limiting governmental power. The foreseeability inquiry
may constitute a sorting mechanism to separate those instances of
judicial interpretation that represent conventional common law-
making or statutory construction, from those that are fueled by an-
imus towards the offender. According to traditional analysis, the
Ex Post Facto Clause protects against arbitrary governance as well
as safeguarding the offender's reliance interest.' 6 ' Judges may in-
terpret common law doctrines, statutes or regulations in order to
increase the severity of the punishment for one particular odious
offender. Perhaps no direct way to police judicial bias exists, but if
a construction is foreseeable, then that foreseeability makes it less
likely that animus was a determining factor.
Thus, on balance, Bouie is best understood as a means of limit-
ing judicial vindictiveness rather than protecting offenders' reli-
ance interests or ensuring repose. The foreseeability analysis acts
as a crude filter to separate judicial reinterpretations animated by
retributive impulses from the more familiar common law evolu-
tionary process.
Indeed, a survey of recent appellate decisions addressing
Bouie claims suggests that Bouie has been applied to those ends.
The real inquiry is not whether the judicial change was foresee-
able, but rather whether the change was motivated by impermissi-
ble reasons.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Insco162 is per-
haps representative. There, an unsuccessful Republican candidate
for Congress was convicted of violating federal election law for
printing and distributing bumper stickers during his 1972 congres-
sional campaign. Insco hoped to capitalize on Senator McGovern's
unpopularity by distributing McGovern-Gunter bumper stick-
ers.' 63 Insco's Democratic opponent, Gunter, had attempted to dis-
tance himself from McGovern. The stickers, however, did not
reveal that Insco's campaign paid for the stickers.' 64 The govern-
ment theorized that the lack of attribution violated the rule
against anonymous campaign materials. The district court judge
161. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
162. 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974).
163. See id. at 205.
164. See id.
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rejected a due process challenge, reasoning that the bumper stick-
ers constituted campaign materials, and that such a possibility
was covered by the plain language of the statute.165
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, in part on the ground
that the defendant had inadequate notice that the use of unat-
tributed bumper stickers violated the statute.16 6 The court noted
that many other federal candidates had used unattributed bumper
stickers, and that this was the first recorded prosecution. 167 Be-
cause "the harsh consequences... are being visited upon an indi-
vidual who lacked authoritative guidance at the time he acted," the
court set aside the conviction. 168 To the court, the prosecutor and
district court judge's determinations to authorize prosecution on
the facts of the case were arbitrary, and conceivably politically mo-
tivated. Bouie served as a means to restrain prosecutorial
excesses.
The Supreme Court's decision in Douglas v. Buder,169 previ-
ously discussed, is to similar effect. In Douglas, the Supreme
Court intervened to stop the apparent arbitrary determination of a
Missouri state court judge to reincarcerate an individual who was
on probation. The probationer had not immediately reported a
traffic citation, as would be required for an arrest.170 The Court
signaled its disbelief that the court would ever have determined
that a traffic citation constituted an arrest but for the court's evi-
dent animus against the probationer.171 Irrespective of whether
the trial court's interpretation was foreseeable, Bouie allows re-
viewing courts to rein in lower courts when they appear influenced
by vindictive or arbitrary aims.' 72
165. See United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
166. See Insco, 496 F.2d at 208.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 209.
169. 412 U.S. 430 (1973).
170. See id. at 430-31.
171. See id. at 431-32. Indeed, the probation officer and prosecutor in the case
had argued that the probationer should not be reincarcerated. See id. at 431.
172. Several courts applied Bouie in the obscenity context to protect defendants
from application of harsher standards. Appellate courts stepped in to protect de-
fendants from the possible parochialism of state trial courts. For instance, in
United States v. Sherpix, 512 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the defendants were
charged with violating obscenity laws for distributing and exhibiting the film "Hot
Circuit." At trial the government persuaded the court to instruct the jury with
respect to a standard of obscenity that was less stringent than the one in existence
at the time the film was shown. See id. at 1365. In 1973, the Supreme Court in
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In contrast, courts have denied Bouie claims when the under-
lying conduct was plainly wrongful, discouraging judicial sympa-
thy for the defendant. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Knutson v.
Brewer173 is representative. In Knutson, the defendant was
charged and convicted of numerous offenses including kidnaping
for ransom, stemming from an incident when he forced himself into
the victim's car, drove to a secluded spot and forced her to commit
sodomy. The kidnaping charge required proof that the defendant
had the intent to receive "any money, property, or thing of value as
a ransom or reward."174 Despite the lack of precedents, 175 the cir-
cuit court upheld the kidnaping conviction on the ground that the
sodomy robbed the victim of a "thing of value." The court con-
cluded that, because the defendant's conduct was immoral, he was
not entitled to rely on a narrow construction of the statutory
term.176
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), altered the definition of obscenity to in-
clude those works, which "taken as a whole, lack[ I serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value." Sherpix, 512 F.2d at 1365. The prior Roth obscenity
standard pertained to works "utterly without redeeming social value." A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413, 418 (1966). The D.C. Circuit later reversed, reasoning that, "[alt the
times appellants distributed and exhibited the film, they could expect to escape
conviction .... Nothing existed to give them notice that their activities were...
criminal if the film merely lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." Sherpix, 512 F.2d at 1366. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
approach in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), reasoning that Miller
marked a significant departure from the prior obscenity standard and that defend-
ants "had no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the new stan-
dards." Id. at 195. The conclusion, however, is difficult to reconcile with
subsequent decisions such as State u. Mummey, 871 P.2d 868 (Mont. 1994) and
Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1989), finding new judicial constructions
to be foreseeable. Indeed, two courts of appeals had disagreed with Sherpix, see
United States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marks,
520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), and there could be little surprise that the Court
would revisit the question. Given that defendant was "engaged in the dicey busi-
ness of marketing films subject to possible challenge," Marks, 430 U.S. at 195, the
change in standards could not have been that much of a surprise. Rather, review-
ing courts presumably were concerned that state trial judges could selectively use
the new standard to penalize unpopular speech in the past.
173. 619 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 748-49 (quoting Iowa Code § 706.3 (1971)).
175. See id. at 749.
176. See id. at 750. The Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48
(1975), can be understood in the same vein. Id. (holding that cunnilingus could be
punished retroactively because it fell within the statutory term "crime against
nature").
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Similarly, courts denying Bouie-type challenges to increases in
punishment also have stressed that the defendants in no way re-
lied upon the former law. For instance, in Dale the court rejected
the Bouie claim in part because defendant faced the same maxi-
mum punishment whether sentenced under the new or discarded
interpretation of the statute.177 To the Court, the fact that an in-
creased likelihood of a greater sentence existed under the new in-
terpretation was irrelevant. 178
Thus, in applying Bouie, courts have departed from the ex post
facto paradigm, respecting reliance interests only where they are
normatively compelling. Courts seem to determine whether bar-
ring retroactive application of a new interpretation is needed to
restrain judicial overreaching. The Bouie inquiry is admittedly ad
hoc, but serves as a last line check against prosecutorial and judi-
cial overreaching.
On balance, therefore, the different treatment afforded legisla-
tive and judicial retroactive interpretations remains striking. The
Bouie foreseeability analysis as applied is far more open-ended
than the Supreme Court's current ex post facto jurisprudence,
which focuses on the impact of the change on the individual
charged with a crime. In contrast, courts protecting due process
concerns pursuant to Bouie in effect look to the underlying intent
of the judicial change.
III. JUSTIFYING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE RETROACTIVE LAWMAKING IN THE
CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Numerous explanations exist to explain, if not justify, Bouie's
desuetude. Judicial retroactivity differs from legislative retroac-
tivity in important respects. Whether any rationale justifies the
courts' crabbed implementation of Bouie principles, however, is
more problematic.
177. Dale, 878 F.2d at 975.
178. Id.; cf Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir.
1986) (en banc) ("The decision whether to commit a crime (or which crime to com-
mit) is unlikely to be much influenced by the details of the criminal justice system
."). The courts' decisions seem to conform to what Professor Kahan describes as
"pattern recognition." Kahan, supra note 45, at 113-14.
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A. Formalist View of Judicial Decision-making
One explanation for the courts' reluctance to limit judicial ret-
roactivity may stem from a belief that judges find, rather than
make, law. This view seems at best quaint today, but jurists as
well as commentators until relatively recently rationalized judicial
power by explaining that judges were only stating what the law
always was rather than fashioning new principles out of whole
cloth. Even when judges changed their minds, they were only stat-
ing what the law should have been all along. If judges do not make
law, then no impediment exists to judicial retroactivity, for judges
should apply what they now understand the law to have always
been to resolve cases and controversies.
Moreover, individuals can only justifiably rely on what the law
is, not on erroneous judicial pronouncements. Individuals can ex-
pect judicial errors to be fixed. Judicial statements cannot be
equated with law.
The writings of Blackstone reflect such a view. In his commen-
taries, Blackstone described the judicial function as a power "not
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound
the old one."17 9 If a judicial precedent "is most evidently contrary
to reason.., or contrary to divine law," then a judge overruling the
prior decision would "not pretend to make a new law, but to vindi-
cate the old one from misrepresentation." 80 Even when a "former
decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such
a sentence was bad law, but that it was not law."1'8 Judges find
law, not make it, and judicial change is necessary to correct prior
mistakes. Blackstone's approach implies retroactive application of
judicial decisions. This is not to suggest that Blackstone believed
that judges never "made" law,' 8 2 but for a variety of reasons-
whether based on jurisprudence or politics-he believed that we
should maintain bright lines to separate the judicial from the legis-
179. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *69.
180. Id. at *69-70.
181. Id. at *70.
182. See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
37 (1996) (arguing that Blackstone's prescription was "a fiction designed to indi-
cate continuity with the past even when innovation had plainly occurred"). Profes-
sor Grant Gilmore noted that "[ais anyone who has the slightest familiarity with
late eighteenth century case law knows, the judges were quite consciously aware of
what they were doing: they were making law, new law, with a sort of joyous
frenzy." Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 6-7 (1977).
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lative craft. Understanding adjudication to be backwards looking
confers legitimacy upon the judicial function-retroactivity there-
fore can be seen as an inevitable byproduct of judging.
The influence of Blackstone should not be underestimated.
Over the years, many legal thinkers have embraced the Black-
stonian notion.'83 Justice Holmes, for instance, defended judicial
retroactivity on the ground that "[lludicial decisions have had ret-
rospective operation for near a thousand years."18 4 More recently,
Justice Scalia has indicated fidelity to this tradition. In James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,'8 5 the Court confronted the ques-
tion whether courts must apply new constitutional rules retroac-
tively.'8 6 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia defended
retroactive application of the new rule in that civil context on a
183. The constitutional theorist Thomas Cooley wrote that "it is said that that
which distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act is, that the one is a determina-
tion of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done or
happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law shall be for the
regulation of all future cases." Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (Bos-
ton, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); see also Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroac-
tive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775 (1936)
(analyzing how the ancient principle that laws should only take effect upon future
transactions became part of the system of constitutional limits on the govern-
ment's power).
184. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Holmes rejected any mechanical account of jurisprudence, but still
stressed the importance of viewing judges as working within a prescribed system
of rules, including retroactivity. See id.
185. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
186. The Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), held that the
Court could apply a new rule prospectively only, or apply the new rule to the case
at bar while withholding additional application until cases were filed after the new
principle was announced. The Court established a balancing test to aid courts in
making that determination. The Court stated:
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which liti-
gants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed
that "we must... [look] to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or
retard its operation." Finally we have weighed the inequity imposed by
retroactive application.
Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
The Court had followed a tack of selective prospectivity, which applied the
new rule in the case at bar but applied the old rule to all cases that antedated the
Court's statement of the new rule, in some criminal procedure cases. See, e.g.,
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). The Court overruled Chevron Oil in Harper
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separation of powers ground. The Article III judicial power "must
be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common-
law tradition. That is the power 'to say what the law is,' not the
power to change it."187 Justice Scalia in the next breath acknowl-
edged that "I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as
to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law."188 However,
he continued that judges make law "as judges make it, which is to
say as though they were 'finding' it-discerning what the law is,
rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will
tomorrow be." 189 In other words, for reasons of tradition and con-
stitutional limitation, Justice Scalia argued that we should treat
judicial decisions as "finding" the law. From that perspective, ret-
roactive application is to be welcomed, not avoided.
The Blackstonian explanation for evisceration of the Bouie
doctrine suffers from numerous drawbacks. First, the explanation
cannot easily account for the very existence of Bouie. If judges
merely find the law, then individuals should be subject to the law
even when such individuals have interpreted or "found" law incor-
rectly on their own. The foreseeability inquiry would be irrelevant,
for the new "correct" judicial interpretation would be foreseeable
almost by definition. It would be the rare case in which the current
law would not be at least foreseeable. Thus, the Blackstonian view
can help explain why we embrace judicial retroactivity, but not the
limited Bouie doctrine that exists.
Second, the Blackstonian explanation for judicial retroactivity
is problematic because it ignores individual interests, as Black-
stone himself may have realized. If individuals in society cannot
"find" the law for themselves, even through diligent inquiry, then
permitting judges to impose punishment based on their discovery
of the law seems quite harsh. The Blackstonian notion simply re-
jects the relevance of reliance. The individual interest to be free
from punishment is sacrificed for the sake of preserving some for-
mal distinction between judging and legislating.
v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), which held that new rules
of federal law must be given full retroactive effect in all pending, non-final cases.
187. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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Third, the Blackstonian explanation is difficult to accept be-
cause the Court in other contexts has adopted a positivist approach
to judicial decision-making. For instance, in Teague v. Lane,190 the
Court held that federal courts must reject all habeas corpus peti-
tions based on "new law," which covers all claims not "dictated" by
precedent. 191 The Court has applied the "new law" prohibition
stringently, rejecting habeas claims that appeared closely related
to prior decisions. 192 That view of judicial decision-making is hard
to reconcile with the Blackstonian notion. 193 The reasoning in
Teague and its progeny stands in sharp contrast to recent decisions
considering Bouie claims. The judicial doctrines considered "new
law" under Teague almost would certainly be considered foresee-
able changes if considered as part of a Bouie-type challenge. 194
Finally, the Blackstonian fiction is difficult to accept because it
ignores not only the reality of judicial lawmaking, but the very real
possibility of arbitrary or vindictive judicial decisions. There is no
room in Blackstone's account for judicial politics and ideology. In
contrast, the lesson of Bouie is that judges may interpret law to
guarantee a particular result in a given case. The Blackstonian
explanation founders on the very fallibility of judges.
190. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
191. Id. at 300.
192. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997); Gray v. Netherland,
116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 (1994); Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990). The new law prohibition
has now been codified by Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1996)).
193. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactiv-
ity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731 (1991); Stephen M. Feld-
man, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and Judicial
Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas
Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1046 (1994); Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Mat-
ters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 423 (1994).
194. Similarly, the Court has reflected a dynamic view of the courts' lawmaking
powers in elaborating official immunity doctrine, under which public officials dis-
charging administrative tasks can claim immunity unless they violate a clearly
established constitutional right of which they should have been aware. See Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Court's doctrine recognizes that courts
fashion new law as a matter of course and accordingly shield officials from the
logical consequences of the evolutionary common law system. See also Fallon &
Meltzer, supra note 193, at 1749-53 (criticizing the Court's elaboration of the im-
munity doctrine in part because it impedes the evolutionary growth of substantive
constitutional law doctrines).
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B. Instrumental Concerns for Judicial Decision-making
Courts' receptivity to judicial retroactivity instead might be at-
tributed to a related conservative impulse to restrain judicial
power. Retroactive application of all new judicial rulings raises
the price of change, for judges must be willing to alter the rights
not only of the parties before them, but of all similarly situated
litigants. When judges recognize that any departure from the sta-
tus quo has problematic consequences, then they may be more
chary of change.
Justice Scalia invoked this institutional rationale in the James
B. Beam case. He stressed that requiring judges to apply all new
rulings retroactively would have the salutary impact of imposing
"one of the understood checks upon judicial law making" because
permitting prospective application of new rules would "render
courts substantially more free to 'make new law,' and thus to alter
in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and
power among the three branches. "195 He expanded on that ration-
ale in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,196 labeling pro-
spective decision-making "a practical tool of judicial activism." 197
He lauded the requirement of retroactive application as an "inher-
ent restraint" on the Court to prevent it from entering more bla-
tantly into the field of lawmaking.198 Given the backdrop of the
Warren Court's judicial activism, forcing judges to apply all new
rulings retroactively seemed a sound way to restrain jurists bent
on changing the law.
The instrumental rationale echoes the justification for other
contemporary doctrines limiting judicial power. For example, in
Griffith v. Kentucky, 199 the Court held that all rulings of criminal
procedure must be fully retroactive to pending cases that were not
as of then final.200 In disclaiming the power to engage in selective
prospectivity, the Court reasoned that the power to disregard cur-
195. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring, joined by Blackmun & Marshall, JJ.).
196. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
197. Harper, 509 U.S. at 107.
198. Id.
199. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
200. See id. Griffith involved the retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from
exercising peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of their
race).
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rent law "is quite simply an assertion that our constitutional func-
tion is not one of adjudication but in effect of legislation."20 1 The
Court therefore mandates retroactive application of all new rules
on direct appeal in both the criminal and civil context.20 2 As in
Griffith, courts might be too prone to change the law if they could
direct that the new law apply prospectively only.
That justification for full retroactivity, however, misses the
point in the criminal law context. Little reason exists to think that
judges will be reluctant to fashion new common law doctrines or
interpretations of statutory language affecting the rights of crimi-
nal offenders due to a requirement of applying all new rulings to
similarly situated offenders. Indeed, the opposite is true. Judges
may be tempted to change interpretations precisely in order to
achieve a retroactive effect and punish particular offenders more
harshly.
To be sure, some judges might feel more free to interpret crim-
inal provisions less favorably to criminal offenders if they knew
that their interpretations did not apply to the particular defend-
ants before them.203 The sympathetic plight of particular defend-
ants might prompt judges to maintain the status quo even when
they believe that the precedent governing liability or punishment
is incorrect. However, I suspect that such cases will be the excep-
tion. On balance, judges are more likely to apply new rulings ret-
roactively that disadvantage, as opposed to benefit, offenders. 20 4
The instrumental justification, therefore, does not explain why
201. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
669 (1971)).
202. See id. The Court in turn relied on Griffith to limit its review in habeas
cases. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court curtailed habeas reme-
dies by adopting a rule of nonretroactivity. The Court reasoned in part that, in
light of the rule of mandated retroactivity on direct appeal, the only new rules to be
recognized on habeas should be those that the Court was prepared to apply to all
pending cases, as opposed to only the petitioner at bar. See id. at 305-10. If the
court was not prepared to apply the new rules to all similarly situated parties,
then the court, as a threshold, should dismiss the petition. As with Griffith,
Teague restrained judicial power by limiting the occasions for federal judicial con-
stitutional lawmaking. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 193.
203. In light of the characteristics of certain defendants, federal judges have
attempted to depart from the strictures of the Sentencing Guidelines in order to be
more lenient. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996) (finding down-
ward departure justified); United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990)
(same).
204. See also supra note 69.
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courts have permitted much judicial retroactive lawmaking that
would be invalidated if enacted by a legislature.
C. Nature of the Judicial Function
The difference in retroactivity doctrines may turn instead on
some of the widely accepted functional differences between adjudi-
cation and legislation. Even if judges make law, they do so inter-
stitially. Judges cannot avoid making law given their tasks of law
interpretation and application. In comparison to the legislature,
however, judges' power to make law is bounded far more
significantly.
First, judges (at least at the federal level) only can act in the
context of cases and controversies-they cannot set their own law-
making agenda. 20 5 Judges must await concrete disputes before
implementing their view of the law. Even then, a desired change
may backfire unless another provision-outside the case or contro-
versy-is also altered. Judges, in other words, cannot mandate
systemic change.
Second, courts must justify their rulings by reference to either
the statutory text or some common law doctrine. Commentators
have not always concurred as to the extent that interpretive princi-
ples constrain judicial power, but the need to rationalize judicial
decisions likely imposes considerable restraint, particularly among
lower court judges who face potential reversal. The fact that opin-
ions are written and widely circulated enhances the prospect of
constraint.
Third, court judgments bind only the parties before the court.
In contrast to a change in judicial lawmaking, legislation causes
far less immediate impact. The opinions of lower court judges may
not even have stare decisis effect. In addition, because most judi-
cial decisions are binary, judges must fashion relief only with an
eye to doing justice between the two parties, irrespective of the im-
pact on society as a whole.
Fourth, even if judicial lawmaking differs from that of the leg-
islature only in degree, line-drawing problems remain. All judicial
decisions include some interpretation. Differentiating between in-
205. The case or controversy requirement restrains state judges to a lesser ex-
tent. See Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State
Regulation of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 353 (1984).
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terpretations that in effect change the law and those which only
build upon precedent is notoriously difficult. Thus, because judges
inescapably fashion law when exercising an interpretive function,
permitting retroactive application of new law may be necessary
due to the administrative line-drawing problem.
The interstitial nature of judicial lawmaking therefore sup-
ports the differential treatment afforded to judicial, as opposed to
legislative, retroactivity. The limitations on judicial lawmaking
suggest that we should not fear judicial as much as legislative ret-
roactive lawmaking. In addition, the discretion inherent in inter-
pretation also points out the difficulty in distinguishing lawmaking
from interpretation. Nonetheless, these considerations do not help
explain why the Bouie doctrine exists, or how to understand what
type of claims are successful under Bouie. The argument that judi-
cial lawmaking threatens liberty less than legislation, though apt,
thus has little to say about demarcating permissible from imper-
missible retroactive application of new or changed judicial
doctrine.
D. Interest Group Analysis
Alternatively, judges may impose more rigorous checks on leg-
islative retroactivity in the criminal context because of their fear of
interest group pressure on legislators. 20 6 Judges may mistrust leg-
islative retroactivity because of the concern that legislators may
vote for retroactive criminal law measures either to pander to the
baser instincts of the electorate or to placate organized interest
groups such as local law enforcement lobbies. 20 7
Those who have been previously convicted of crimes have little
clout in the legislature. 20 8 Criminal offenders throughout history
206. For an overview of the interest group account, see Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (1991) and Den-
nis C. Mueller, Public Choice 11 (1989).
207. For a more complete discussion of this account, see Krent, supra note 45,
at 2168-73.
208. The ex post facto doctrine also protects against criminalizing conduct that
was lawful when undertaken. Although individuals who have committed acts
which the legislature now wishes to criminalize may lack financial resources with
which to mount an effective lobbying campaign, they have every incentive to lobby
the legislature to ensure that any criminal prohibition is, at the most, prospective
in operation. Such individuals may enjoy somewhat more access than those previ-
ously convicted of crimes, even though the proposed legislation may inhibit organi-
zational activities because of the threatened stigma. Because (perhaps not
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have tended to be poor 209 and disproportionately comprised of mi-
norities,210 thereby minimizing their ability to affect legislation.
That comparative lack of political power is compounded by the in-
ability of many felons to vote.211 For a variety of reasons, there-
fore, felons rarely can form coalitions with other groups seeking
influence in the political process. Thus, when legislators decide
whether to apply harsher punishments retroactively as in Lynce or
coincidentally) legislatures have not criminalized conduct that was innocent when
undertaken, I focus in this section primarily on legislation that increases the pen-
alties for crimes previously committed.
209. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Com-
pelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 Ind. L.J. 363, 379 n.102
(1993); Jeffrey R. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better
Balance the Interests of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 Minn. L.
Rev. 977, 986 n.48 (1994).
When law enforcement measures proposed in Congress affect monied inter-
ests, however, then the political process affords substantial opportunity for protest.
For instance, Congress in 1986 required law enforcement agents to obtain a judi-
cial order prior to imposing a pen register, see 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (1986), not because
of privacy concerns in general, but rather because of the lobbying of telephone com-
panies which wished to limit law enforcement authorities' unbridled discretion to
order pen registers and thereby force the telephone companies to expend re-
sources. Similarly, Congress passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000aa (1980), to forbid searches of only one influential group, newspaper offices,
unless the police can demonstrate that a subpoena would be ineffective-no other
third party such as accountants, physicians, or neighbors-were protected. See
Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?,
44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079, 1083-85 (1993). Indeed, the inability of those who are
poor to affect legislation concerning punishments has long been recognized. Cf
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down an Oklahoma law man-
dating sterilization for those committing three or more crimes, but exempting
those committing financial or political crimes).
210. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 198 (113th ed. 1993); Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Pro-
cess, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1472, 1495-96 (1988); Douglas A. Smith et al., Equity and
Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 234 (1984); see also Kay L. Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organ-
ized Interests and American Democracy 250-251 (1986) (examining the lack of rep-
resentation of minorities, and poor, in PACs); Alice E. Harvey, Comment, Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for a Second
Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145 (1994) (arguing that disenfranchisement of felons
dilutes minority voting power).
211. Many states have disenfranchised felons. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. VIII,
§ 182; Ariz. Const. art. 7, § 2; Del. Const. art. V, § 2; Fla. Coast. art. 6, § 4; Iowa
Const. art. 2, § 5; Ky. Const. § 145; Md. Const. art. I, § 4; Miss. Const. art. 12,
§ 241; Nev. Const, art. 2, § 1, N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 11; N.M. Const. art. VII, § 1;
Tenn. Const. art. I, § 5; Utah Const. art. IV, § 6; Va. Const. art. II, § 1; Wyo. Const.
art. 6, § 6.
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Weaver, or to penalize conduct which was legal when committed,
the political process in a sense malfunctions, warranting more ex-
acting judicial review.212
That malfunction is particularly disturbing in light of legisla-
tive incentives. Legislators may impose new sanctions against of-
fenders to curry the favor of constituents or contributors.
Legislators recognize that their ability to be reelected may hinge
on the public's perception of their toughness against crime.213 If
voters and contributors are uncertain how to tackle the root causes
of crime, then they may well react by applauding every effort to
deal with offenders more harshly. The popularity of three strikes-
and-you're-out legislation can be explained by legislators' pander-
ing to public perception. 214 Indeed, federal legislators' eagerness
to federalize state crimes such as caijacking215 or drive by shoot-
ings2 16 similarly evince, at least in part, legislative efforts to cater
to the public's desire for vigorous action against crime. The fact
212. In addition, legislators, as well as their constituents, will identify far more
readily with victims of crime than with perpetrators. Cf Dripps, supra note 209, at
1079 (making a similar point regarding the need for judicial review of law enforce-
ment investigative techniques approved by the legislatures).
213. As Representative Bill McCollum (R-Fla.) recently explained, "[firequent
news reports of vicious crimes shock and frighten the public and send policy mak-
ers searching for new solutions." Bill McCollum, The Struggle for Effective Anti-
Crime Legislation-An Analysis of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 561, 561 (1995). Such news reports inflate
the public's perception of the extent of crime. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got
to Do with it: The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors
Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff Crim. L. Rev. 23
(1997); see also Charles B. Wise, The Dynamics of Legislation: Leadership and Pol-
icy Change in the Congressional Process xi, xii (1991) (addressing how news sto-
ries in the popular press lead to criminal legislation); Thomas M. Mengler, The
Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary
from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. Kan. L. Rev. 503, 504-08 (1995)
(same).
In January 1994, more than 40% of Americans surveyed identified crime as
the most critical problem facing the nation. See Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak,
A Nation with Peril on its Mind; Crime Has Become the Top Concern of Many Peo-
ple, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al, available in 1994 WL 2134263.
214. California and Washington recently have enacted such legislation, as has
Congress in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. Most doubt the effectiveness of such laws to reduce
crime, and many fear the cost. See, e.g., infra note 217.
215. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994); see also Stephen Chippendale, Note, More
Harm than Good: Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 455,
464-65 (1994) (addressing the federal car jacking statute).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2)(A) (1994).
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that Congress enacted some sixty death penalty provisions217 in
the recent Crime Control Act, many of which are overlapping, 218 is
further testament to this same interest in gaining votes and
contributions.219
Even though all criminal legislation may suffer from a poten-
tial political process defect, the dangers of retroactive lawmaking
are greater. A requirement of prospectivity ensures that the legis-
lature at a minimum will impose punishment on a larger group of
people whose members are not easily identifiable. The generality
of the provision helps to prevent singling out particular offenders
for punishment, and diminishes to some extent the role of emotion
underlying legislative enactment of new crimes or increases in
punishment for crimes already on the books. 220 The legislature
cannot enact such laws with the purpose of punishing individuals
that have committed anti-social acts.
In addition, when legislating prospectively, legislators likely
act with greater caution and deliberation. Legislators must be
willing to risk overdeterring productive social activity due to the
enhanced penalties. 221 Moreover, when legislators extend or au-
thorize incarceration for an unknown number of individuals, they
may be constrained by financial concerns that are not as pressing
when imposing punishment only on the comparatively fewer indi-
viduals targeted by retroactive measures.
Nonetheless, courts routinely have struck down legislation
under the Ex Post Facto Clause without any evidence of legislative
vindictiveness or antipathy directed towards any particular indi-
viduals or groups. The good time credit policy in Weaver applied to
217. See David Johnson & Steven A. Holmes, Experts Doubt Effectiveness of
Crime Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1994, at A16, available in 1994 WL 12730832.
218. For instance, the death penalty is authorized for killings arising out of
destruction of both maritime navigational facilities, see 18 U.S.C. § 2280(a)(1)(E)
(1994), and maritime fixed platforms, see id. § 2281(a)(1).
219. Although I focus on access to the legislature, the executive shapes legisla-
tion as well. Little evidence exists that those convicted of crime have any more
influence in that forum than they do in the legislature.
220. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46-49, 51-55 (1964). Congress still
may create a new crime, as with caijacking, but at least those previously commit-
ting the crimes will not be offered as a sacrifice to the public's demand for crude
vengeance.
221. Although the legislature need not worry about over-deterring murderers,
valid concern may exist for chilling the conduct of corporations in the regulatory
crimes context.
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all falling within the categories enumerated within Florida's penal
system. 222 The sentencing changes in Miller and in Lindsey af-
fected a broad array of individuals committing particular crimes.
Moreover, all the changes applied prospectively as well, muting
much of the concern for the singling out problem. Still, banning
retroactivity might be salutary even in the context of across-the-
board change. The legislature may increase punishment only to
ensure greater punishment for particular individuals based on
prior acts. Although the checks of generality and prospectivity
minimize that chance, the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents legisla-
tors from enacting prospective legislation to punish particular indi-
viduals for past conduct. Drawing the line to prevent additional
punishment (or criminalization of previously legal conduct), there-
fore, is a sensible idea, even if prospective legislation on occasion
may be just as arbitrary.
Thus, the courts' activist review under the Ex Post Facto
Clause can be justified in part by a process defect. We do not trust
majoritarian political processes when criminal penalties are ap-
plied to identifiable individuals, despite the fact that those commit-
ting anti-social acts should often lose in the political process.
Rather than examine each legislative enactment to ascertain
whether it trenches upon the values underlying the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Court has created a prophylactic restraint against leg-
islative overreaching to counteract the inadequacies of the political
process to prevent arbitrary or vindictive legislation.
In contrast, judges trust themselves, and arguably should, not
to give vent to vindictiveness in construing particular criminal en-
actments. Less reason exists to fear judicial than legislative antip-
athy towards offenders. Federal judges, at least, need not face
electoral disapproval. Thus, they are insulated to a considerable
degree from the pressure confronting legislators to be tough on
crime.223 Judges certainly are not immune from the same retribu-
tivist impulses shared by many individuals in society-and hang-
ing judges undoubtedly exist. Judges, however, need not pander to
222. The restriction of administrative gain time credits addressed in Lynce,
however, was targeted at those who committed serious crimes, such as the at-
tempted murder in Lynce itself. 117 S. Ct. at 894. Thus, there was more of a
singling out problem than in Weaver.
223. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Deci-
sion-Making, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 941, 965 (1995) ("[Tlhe decision-maker should be in-
sulated from influences that would frustrate application of [legal] rules.").
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others' rage as a means to retaining their jobs. Indeed, any venge-
ful drive may be tempered in some judges by a desire for pres-
tige224 or alternatively, because of the judicial ethos of remaining
as objective as possible.225 In short, no special reason may exist to
be suspicious of retroactive judicial construction of federal criminal
statutes.
We may be more wary, however, about state trial court judges.
The data cited earlier confirm that almost every successful Bouie
claim has arisen out of state court changes in criminal law doc-
trine.226 Successful challengers have targeted state trial courts in
particular for their unexpected construction of state statutes or un-
foreseeable changes in common law doctrine. Federal judges scru-
tinize state judges' retroactive application of new interpretations
more closely than their own.
At least two reasons exist for the skepticism. First, federal
judges on the whole may have greater technical competence than
their state counterparts. 227 Part of the reason may stem from the
greater resources (e.g., law clerks, computerization) at their dispo-
sal.228 Part of the reason also may stem from greater experi-
ence. 229 In light of such disparities, federal courts-and indeed
state supreme courts as well-may cast a critical eye on state
judicial decision-making which enlarges criminal liability or
punishment.230
224. Cf. Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 Pub.
Choice 107, 129 (1983) (stating that judges are motivated by desire for prestige).
225. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 130-131 (1995) (stating that
judges benefit from following rules of judicial impartiality); Cass, supra note 223,
at 978.
226. The empirical finding undoubtedly is due in part to the comparative
dearth of federal criminal statutes. However, part of the answer lies in federal
court mistrust of state judicial processes.
227. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1121-24
(1977); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory:
A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev.
329, 337 (1988).
228. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 38
(1996).
229. See Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Ex-
cellence, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 797 (1995).
230. For an empirical analysis revealing modest differences between federal
and state judicial decisionmaking, see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of
Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213 (1983). Part of the reason for en-
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Second, federal courts implicitly may fear that interest groups
wield greater influence over state than federal judges. Without
question, state courts are more politically accountable than courts
within the federal system. Most state court judges are directly re-
sponsible to the public through elections. 231 The electorate can
mobilize to defeat any judge who is deemed insufficiently deferen-
tial to the state legislature. Judges have been voted out of office
due to public outcry over their decisions.232 Moreover, state court
decisions are more subject to state constitutional amendment than
are federal decisions. 233 The barriers to amendment under state
constitutions are lower, and empirical studies have borne out the
comparative frequency with which states have amended their
constitutions. 234
To be sure, many criminal law cases are low salience in that
resolution of such cases do not appear on the public's radar screen.
Controversial death penalty decisions, 236 however, and even rou-
tine suppression motions, 236 at times garner public attention. The
risk of appearing soft on crime or insensitive to crime victims per-
vades all decision-making. On balance, therefore, state court
judges, because of their interest in reelection, are more prone to
hanced federal court scrutiny of state judicial decision-making may stem as well
from an elitist bias on the part of federal judges.
231. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 725-26 (1995).
232. See id. at 737. Three supreme court justices from California, for instance,
lost reelection bids in 1986 principally because of their opposition to the death
penalty. See Philip E. Johnson, The Court on Trial: The California Judicial Elec-
tion of 1986 (Supreme Court Project 1985). One Tennessee Supreme Court justice
similarly lost an election in 1996 that became a referendum on application of the
death penalty. See Stephen B. Bright, Hanging the Judge: Demagogues, Politi-
cians Chip Away at U.S. Court System, Arizona Republic, June 8, 1997, at H1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. The impact of voter accountabil-
ity on death penalty decision-making has also been studied in Louisiana. See Me-
linda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes
and a Case Study, 49 J. Pol. 1117 (1987).
233. See Williams, supra note 205, at 381.
234. See, e.g., Janice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revis-
ited, 17 Publius: J. Federalism 153, 169-79 (1987).
235. See supra note 232.
236. The recent controversy surrounding President Clinton and former Senator
Dole's attack on federal district court Judge Harold Baer for granting a suppres-
sion motion provides a case in point. See Abner J. Mikva, Open Season on Judges,
American Lawyer 5 (June 4, 1997).
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the same kind of influences that arguably justify stringent judicial
review of legislative retroactivity under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
The interest group analysis therefore helps solve the puzzle of
why courts scrutinize retroactive legislation closely in the ex post
facto context, but seemingly sanction so much retroactivity in the
Bouie-type cases. The key to the Court's ex post facto jurispru-
dence lies not in reliance, but in the potential for vindictive or arbi-
trary lawmaking. The comparative ability of interest groups to
capture the legislature's ear explains why courts more strictly
oversee legislative, as opposed to judicial, retroactive lawmaking.
Although the judicial system clearly is not immune from interest
group pressure,23 7 legislators are more likely to make policy with
an eye toward the next election. Criminal offenders usually do not
vote and have comparatively little influence in the political arena.
In contrast to federal judges, state judges often are more suscepti-
ble to political pressure.238
Thus, judges' relative insulation from the political market-
place explains to some extent why courts have declined to afford
the Bouie doctrine much play. For a mixture of reasons, judges are
far more suspicious of legislators' motives than those of their peers.
Nevertheless, judges recognize that state trial judges in particular
can be swayed by popular prejudice and the need for constituent
approval. Therefore, they have retained a kernel of the Bouie doc-
trine by reserving the power to set aside retroactive decisions
which seem motivated by animus or caprice. The seemingly ran-
dom cases in which Bouie challenges prevail can only be under-
stood as a reaction-though, far from consistent or coherent-to
the potential harm from arbitrary judicial decision-making. Thus,
237. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judi-
cial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31 (1991) (sketching the advantages that interest
groups possess in litigation). Nonetheless, courts may be more responsive to those
underrepresented in the political process. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Dis-
trust (1980); Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial
Review 2, 17-25 (1966).
238. The interest group analysis does not shed light upon the offender's argua-
ble interest in repose. The concern for repose should be just as acute whether the
legislature or judiciary threatens increased punishment. From an offender's per-
spective, there is an understandable grouping of all actors together as integral
parts of the governmental system. Judicial rulings that have the effect of length-
ening the time of incarceration interfere with a rehabilitative ideal to the same
extent as retroactive application of legislative decisions. Current application of the
Bouie doctrine does not respect the offender's interest in repose.
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although the Bouie doctrine has never been overruled, courts over
time implicitly have narrowed its rationale and sharply reduced its
scope.
CONCLUSION
Judicial retroactivity remains the norm in our system, even in
criminal cases. Although the Supreme Court held in Bouie that ex
post facto principles govern judicial decision-making through the
Due Process Clause, courts widely have ignored Bouie in applica-
tion. Despite the absence of notice to the offender, courts routinely
have concluded that new interpretations of statutory text or com-
mon law precedents apply retroactively.
The courts' approach plausibly can be explained by recogniz-
ing that the rationale for the Ex Post Facto Clause has shifted
away from protecting reliance interests per se to protecting more
amorphous rule of law concerns. Notwithstanding language in
various opinions to the contrary, 239 courts currently recognize that
the solicitude for notice has been overstated, given that increases
in punishment so rarely interfere with reliance interests, and then
seldom interfere with reliance interests we wish to protect as a
normative matter. Rather, courts applying the Ex Post Facto
Clause attempt to prevent legislators from catering to constituents
and contributors by retroactively punishing or imposing harsher
punishments on those least able to safeguard their own interests
in the legislative arena. Legislative incentives may too readily
point toward enhancing the punishment of known offenders, or
criminalizing conduct that has outraged constituents. Because
they are marginalized, those subject to such legislation cannot
band together effectively to wield influence upon legislators to the
extent their numbers would otherwise suggest possible. Prohibit-
ing retroactivity helps prevent enactment of prospective legislation
merely to ensure that a particular offender receives greater
punishment.
In contrast, because judges are not as prone to be tough on
criminals for the sake of career advancement, checks on retroactive
lawmaking are not as critical. Judges trust other judges not to
give vent to retributive urges in construing legislation or past
precedents. Retroactive application therefore is the norm, with the
239. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
1997]
94 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:35
Bouie doctrine serving as a crude tool to permit appellate judges to
intervene in egregious contexts to prevent arbitrary or vindictive
rulings. Unfortunately, application of the truncated Bouie doctrine
may at times itself seem arbitrary, but the doctrine as imple-
mented may well be worth preserving as a way of reminding
judges that judicial interpretations should not be motivated by any
desire to enhance the punishment of an especially objectionable
offender.
